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Marc O. DeGirolami1
The apparent state of relations [between Congress and the judiciary] is more tense than at 
any time in my lifetime.2
When the political branches get involved in a specific case that’s pending before the 
judge, or when the political branches start going after a judge or making threats in a way that 
affects ongoing cases, that interference oversteps the line of judicial independence.  The political 
branches may well be right to stand that line and criticize judges.  But they should not do so 
while cases or issues are still pending before the judge.  If they do so, and the criticism cuts so 
deeply, as it may have done in the Bayless3 case, the best response is for the judge to step back 
from the case and recuse himself.  He should do so not because he is going to be influenced by 
political threats, -- I think few judges are, and I don’t think Judge Baer was -- but because the 
public perception is going to be that the latter decision -- whether to stick to his original decision 
or to change his mind -- will have been the result of political pressure.4
The judicial branch has lately become the subject of an increasing and far ranging 
scrutiny and distrust by its legislative counterpart.  Congressional suspicion is often directed 
toward judges’ traditional discretion in criminal sentencing and, more generally, the degree to 
which judges are beholden to (and, therefore, exercise case-by-c ase judgment by reliance upon) a 
particular ideological point of view or personal bias.  The distrust has bred a potent strain of 
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2political opportunism which Congress has manifested in several recent bills.  One of these, the 
Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act,5 all but eliminates what was once the judge’s 
province and tacitly threatens judges’ continued employment.  Likewise, Congress is considering 
legislation that would disavow citation in judicial opinions to foreign legal sources.6  The 
consequences to maverick judges who disregard the congressional will about what should and 
should not be written into American case law are not yet clear, but some in the House of 
Representatives have already suggested that removal from office is a distinct and viable 
possibility.  There are frequent calls, particularly from certain voices in the House, for “judicial 
accountability” for decisions that are controversial, politically debatable, or otherwise 
purportedly not in keeping with popular opinion.  
The natural progression of these tendencies may or may not be toward more frequent 
impeachment of federal judges; it is probable, however, that the future holds more threats of 
removal.7  This article explores the use of threats of removal against federal judges and why the 
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3incidence of these types of threats is likely to increase.  In Part I, after presenting the textual 
sources authorizing judicial removal, I survey briefly the history and quality of certain judicial 
impeachments and threatened removals.  In Part II, I examine two recent pieces of legislation, 
the Feeney Amendment and House of Representatives Resolution 568 (which has not yet been 
enacted), that serve as able vehicles for legislators to level threats of removal against judges for 
noncompliance with certain political ideologies or objectives.  In Part III, I ask what may explain 
the increased prevalence of threats of removal by legislators against judges.  In answer, I 
advance two theories, the first of which posits that the threat of judicial removal is a perfectly 
rational choice for legislators given the power structure between the branches as it has developed 
in modern times; therefore, such threats will become an increasingly frequent occurrence even 
though they are not necessarily followed by impeachment itself.  The second explanatory theory 
is based on the growing public perception (from within and outside the legal profession) of the 
judiciary as incapable of performing its judging function credibly.  I argue that some of the 
traditional beliefs about the role of judges have been irremediably undermined by a culture that 
deems criticism, in as great abundance as possible, a paramount virtue.  I submit that the 
legislature has capitalized on both the popularity of judicial criticism and the lack of public 
confidence in the judiciary to advance its own political ends.  These two theories, working in 
conjunction, provide a basis for understanding the increased incidence of legislative threats of 
removal against judges and for the belief that the present socio-political climate will conduce to 
more frequent and forceful threats of removal in the future.  After considering and rejecting 
planned to introduce a bill to remove four Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justices “as a tool to pressure 
members of the court to reconsider their landmark 4-3 decision or risk losing their judgeships”), this article will 
focus primarily on threats to remove federal judges.  
4several commonly voiced remedies for the current state of congressional and public hostility 
toward the judiciary, I conclude in Part IV that the relationship between the legislative and 
judicial branches will continue to deteriorate, and that congressional threats of removal will play 
an increasingly central role in this failure.  
I. The Constitutional Text and Its Use
The authority to remove a federal judge from office traditionally has been interpolated 
from (as it is not expressly located in)8 two characteristically vague constitutional provisions: (1) 
All “civil Officers of the United States” are to be “removed from office on impeachment for, and 
conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors”9; and (2) federal 
judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behavior.”10  The Constitution sets out no other 
particulars with respect to these sections, but does add in Article III that the “trial of all crimes, 
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.”11  There are no other constitutional details 
governing the conditions under which a federal judge may be removed.12
8 See Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges?  A Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 209, 213 (1993).
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
10 U.S. CONST art. III, § 1.
11 U.S. CONST art. III, § 2, cl. 3.  The process of impeachment is administered by both Houses of Congress.  The 
House of Representatives is vested with the power of impeachment.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.  This is the 
process by which the articles of impeachment are formulated (as in an indictment by a grand jury) and voted on (a 
simple majority suffices).  The House’s vote to impeach catalyzes the Senate’s “sole power” to try impeachments, 
along with its power to convict the object of the impeachment with the “concurrence of two thirds of all members 
present.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
12
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5Moreover, Congress has never undertaken, by act, constitutional Amendment, or 
otherwise, to define or set the parameters encompassing the phrase “good behavior.”13  It has 
likely never been one of Congress’s priorities.  The impeachment armamentarium has been 
brought to bear infrequently: from 1799 to the present, only sixteen persons have been tried by 
the Senate on impeachment by the House, and only seven of those were removed from office.  
Of that sixteen, however, twelve – 75% – have been federal judges, and seven have resulted in 
removals from office.14  In contrast to the number of impeachment trials, however, there have 
been fifty-eight judicial investigations by the House of Representatives (the first official act in 
the impeachment chain).15  The two earliest judicial impeachment trials, those of Judge John 
Pickering and Justice Samuel Chase, give the first glimpse of the political practicalities of 
judicial removal.  Judge Pickering’s impeachment was motivated in large measure by his 
of the Court of Veteran Appeals); 10 U.S.C. § 942(c) (judges of the Court of Military Appeal); 28 U.S.C. § 631(i) 
(magistrate judges).
13
 The “good behavior” standard was a carryover from English law.  See William G. Ross, The Hazards of 
Proposals to Limit the Tenure of Federal Judges and to Permit Judicial Removal without Impeachment, 35 VILL. L. 
REV. 1063, 1067 (1990).  Judicial lifetime tenure, therefore, is not expressly required by the Constitution; it is 
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and the Article III Judge, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 131, 135 (2004); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged 
and Other Institutional Ramifications of the Clinton Scandals, 60 MD. L. REV. 59, 75 (2001) (arguing that the 
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(acquitted February 27, 1905); Robert W. Archbald, Associate Judge, U.S. Commerce Court (removed January 13, 
1913); George W. English, District Judge for the Eastern District of Illinois (resigned November 4, 1926, 
proceedings dismissed); Harold Louderback, District Judge for the Northern District of California (acquitted May 
24, 1933); Halsted L. Ritter, District Judge for the Southern District of Florida (removed from office April 17, 
1936); Harry E. Claiborne, District Judge for the District of Nevada (removed from office October 9, 1986); Alcee 
L. Hastings, District Judge for the Southern District of Florida (removed from office October 20, 1988); Walter L. 
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15
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6debilitating senility and alcoholism.16  The four articles of impeachment leveled against him all 
related to his decisions in a particular case and included a charge that his deportment on the 
bench consisted of “ravings, cursings, and crazed incoherences.”17  The day after the removal of 
Judge Pickering for incompetence (and only nominally, by his political adversaries, for high 
crimes and misdemeanors), eight articles of impeachment were brought against Justice Chase.18
The majority of the charges against Chase were rooted in the perception of him (rightly, it 
seems) as “impatient, overbearing, and at times arrogant,” but, with one notable exception, legal 
historians have emphasized the role of Chase’s political enemies in calling for his 
impeachment.19  The charges against Chase related to his decisions while on the bench: in one 
case, preventing counsel from relying on relevant precedent; in another, refusing to excuse a 
juror who had prejudged the case; in a third, tampering with a grand jury; and in a fourth, 
delivering an inappropriate political speech to a jury.20  Justice Chase was impeached by the 
House but acquitted by the Senate.
It has been observed that the impeachment and acquittal of Justice Chase “set a precedent 
16 See HON. WILLIAM  H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORICAL IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL 
CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 127 (1992). 
17 Id. (citing ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL, VOL. III (1919)).
18 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered Branch, 1801-1805, 33 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 219, 249 (1998).
19 See REHNQUIST, supra note 16, at 88.  The exception is Raoul Berger, who believes that the charges against 
Justice Chase were sufficiently egregious to justify his removal.  See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 299, 250 (1973).
20 See EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL FINKELMAN, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES 101-07 (1999).
7that no judge would ever be removed for high-handed decisionmaking.”21  An alternative view, 
however, is that the impeachment and acquittal of Justice Chase was the first threatened but not 
consummated removal – the prototypical congressional response to the kind of judicial conduct 
that, though perhaps not ultimately meriting removal in that it fails to qualify as a high crime or 
misdemeanor, is controversial enough to draw the ire of political enemies in Congress.  One 
might characterize it as “bad behavior” – not impeachment-worthy but nevertheless deserving, in 
the eyes of disapproving legislators, of some direct reaction.  The next impeachment, that of 
Judge James Peck, follows this model.  Peck was charged with abuse of power for issuing a 
contempt citation against and imprisoning a lawyer who had criticized him in a newspaper for 
conduct that related specifically to Peck’s decisions in a particular case; Peck, too, was 
impeached and acquitted (though by only one vote in the Senate).22  Likewise, “[h]igh-handed 
decisionmaking was included among the articles of impeachment” against Judge Charles Swayne 
(abuse of the contempt power) and Judge George English (“willfully, tyrannically, and 
oppressively” disbarring lawyers).23  Judge Swayne was impeached and acquitted and Judge 
English was impeached and resigned prior to his trial.24  The next judicial impeachment and 
acquittal pattern, the case of Judge Harold Louderback, does not follow the model: Louderback 
was impeached for engaging in financial improprieties and for bringing the bench into disrepute; 
21
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8he was subsequently acquitted.25
Most interesting for understanding the implications of the “bad behavior” model is the 
case of Judge Harold Baer, Jr.  In 1996, Judge Baer suppressed evidence of narcotics activity 
based on a finding that the police had conducted an illegal search,26 and the government filed a 
motion for reconsideration shortly thereafter.  In that election year, Baer’s decision elicited an 
immediate and violent response.  More than two hundred members of Congress, led by 
Representatives Bill McCollum, Fred Upton, and Michael Forbes, wrote President Clinton 
decrying the decision and demanding that the President call for Judge Baer’s resignation.27
Former Senator Bob Dole, then the Republican presidential candidate, threatened Judge Baer 
with impeachment and President Clinton (himself likely concerned about appearing “soft on 
crime”) intimated that a forced resignation might be in the offing depending on the Judge’s 
disposition of the motion for reconsideration.28  Judge Baer granted the motion.29
Judge Baer’s situation does not strictly fit the model for “bad,” but non-impeachable, 
behavior that nevertheless draws an angry congressional response because Baer was not 
24 Id.
25
 Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting the Law of Impeachment in Perspective, 43 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 905, 922 n.104 (1999); 
Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function Theory, The Hamilton Affair, and Other Constitutional Mythologies, 77 
N.C.L. REV. 1791, 1832-33 (1999): “The Louderback case reflected a trend in the House of investigating or 
impeaching officials for any conduct – official or unofficial – viewed as bringing an office ‘into disrepute’ or raising 
compelling questions of legitimacy.”
26 United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 243 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on reconsideration, 921 F. Supp. 211 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
27 See Jon O. Newman, The Judge Baer Controversy, 80 JUDICATURE 156, 157 (1997).
28
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9impeached and then acquitted.  However, Baer’s decision to reverse himself created suspicion 
that he had been intimidated by threats of removal (or forced resignation) if he did not do so.30
The incident also sparked the resurgence of friction between the judiciary and Congress about 
what conduct merits removal.  Responding to a joint statement issued by the Second Circuit 
defending Judge Baer against threats of removal, former Senator Dole wrote:
You offer the opinion that “[a] ruling in a contested case cannot remotely be considered a 
ground for impeachment.”  Again, I must take exception.  Only a few years ago, the 
Supreme Court held that matters of impeachment are left by the Constitution to the 
political branches of the federal government and that courts are powerless to review 
impeachment decisions.  It is thus for the Congress to decide what constitutes a proper 
basis under the Constitution for impeaching federal judges.31
This statement is revealing in that it typifies Congress’ present approach when faced with 
judicial conduct that may not be egregious enough for impeachment32 but nevertheless is felt to 
demand some forceful, critical response.  Professor Gerhardt has written that “the Article III 
[“good behavior” clause] formula could sensibly be read either as (1) setting a substantive 
standard of conduct on which judicial tenure is contingent, or as (2) employing an eighteenth-
century term of art to signal that federal judges shall hold tenure for life unless impeached, and, 
thus, that the good behavior clause itself does not establish a separate or independent basis for 
removal other than those specified in the impeachment clauses.”33  When confronted with likely 
30
 Gerhardt, supra note 28, at 74; Thomas I. Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of the Federal 
Judiciary, 46 VILL. L. REV. 745, n.126 (2001) (“The implication that the threats of removal affected the judge’s 
ruling is apparent.”).
31
 Newman, supra note 27, at 162-63 (quoting then Senator Dole’s letter of April 9, 1996 to Judges Lumbard, 
Feinberg, Oakes, and Newman) (citation omitted).
32 See Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 973, 989 (2001).
33 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
83-86 (2d ed. 2000).  Gerhardt goes on to conclude that the second alternative is more consistent with historical 
evidence.
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unimpeachable but highly politically objectionable (for Dole) behavior, Dole made intentionally 
murky the type of conduct that would qualify for impeachment by emphasizing Congress’ 
inviolable power to define such conduct at will.  The implication of his position is an 
endorsement of Gerhardt’s first alternative as the proper interpretation of the “good behavior” 
clause.  In fact, the inherent ambiguity of the “good behavior” standard and its meaning for 
judicial tenure is a credible mechanism to support Congress’ insistence that the possible grounds 
for impeachment are not capable of close definition, and depend more on particular legislative 
whimsy.34  Thus, while actually impeaching a judge remains as complicated and lengthy a 
process as ever, threatening a judge with impeachment, and thereby imposing the full heft of 
political and public disapproval upon him, is both a viable and readily usable congressional 
instrument of control over the judiciary.35  Whether or not Judge Baer (or anyone else) believed 
that he would be impeached based on his disposition of the motion for reconsideration in 
34
 It is true that the weight of scholarly commentary concludes that the “good behavior” standard was not meant to 
increase the number of grounds for impeachment beyond those covered by “high crimes and misdemeanors,” and 
therefore that there is no difference between the grounds upon which elected officials and judges may be impeached.  
See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 33, at 83-86; LAURENCE H.TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 2-7, at 166 
(3d ed. 2000).  Nevertheless, since the issue is not entirely resolved, see, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF 
STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 103-04 (1999) (arguing that there 
should be different standards for impeaching judges and elected officials); Geyh, supra note 21, at 164 (defining one 
of the elements of “doctrinal [judicial] independence” as requiring that Congress “not remove judges during good 
behavior”), and since it is in Congress’ interest to keep the grounds for judicial impeachment deliberately vague, 
credible threats of impeachment may be made against judges for any number of reasons not technically within the 
purview of the “high crimes and misdemeanors” clause.
35
 It is for this reason that I do not agree with Professor Gerhardt’s claim that “[t]he threat of impeachment no longer 
seems to carry the stigma it once did.”  Gerhardt, supra note 28, at 77.  Gerhardt contends that the cumbersomeness 
of impeachment proceedings is inconsistent with the modern-day public’s short attention span and the numerous 
constraints on legislators’ time.  I agree that commencing and carrying through to completion an impeachment and 
conviction may be less feasible today than in the past.  But threatened removals, which have none of the problems 
identified by Gerhardt, have, in fact, become easier and more frequent (some of the reasons for this are described in 
Part III(B)) just as consummated impeachments have become more difficult.  See Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on 
Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 205-06 (2003) (“Although Congress rarely removes 
judges from office, threats of impeachment are fairly common.”).
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Bayless, he may well have felt that his job security and his ability to function as a judge had been 
compromised by the congressional threats against him.
II. Recent Legislation That Enables Congressional Threats of Removal
As the previous section demonstrates, the meaning of “good behavior” and its role in 
defining the scope of impeachable conduct has proven notoriously elusive.  The amorphous 
moral qualities adumbrated by the phrase put one in mind of the colorful statements of the 
Roman historian Tacitus, who in relating the impeachments of A.D. 57, described those 
convicted as “stained with the foulest guilt,” “audacious[ly] wicked[]” and “supported by corrupt 
influence.”36
Of course, incompetence in the fulfillment of one’s juridical duties, as we have seen in 
the example of Judge Pickering, is grounds for removal.37  And few would dispute that bribery, 
extortion, and embezzlement of public funds are all examples of “bad” behavior.38  The grayer 
shades come into focus when one considers an act that arguably violates “public rights and 
duties” owed to society at large,39 or “which in some way corrupts or subverts the judicial or 
governmental process,” or which is “plainly wrong in [itself] to a person of honor, or a good 
36 TACITUS, THE ANNALS AND HISTORIES, Book XIII, ch. 33 (Alfred John Church, trans., The Modern Library 
Classics 2003).
37
 Even Plato speaks disparagingly of judges who fall asleep in open court.  See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 147 (H.D.P 
Lee, trans., Penguin Classics 1955) (“[H]ow far better it is to arrange one’s life so that one has no need of a judge 
dozing on the bench.”).
38 See Maria Simon, Note, Bribery and Other Not So “Good Behavior”: Criminal Prosecution as a Supplement to 
Impeachment of Federal Judges, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1637 (1994).  To these surely could be added most 
felonies.  See Akhil R. Amar, On Judicial Impeachment and Its Alternatives, Remarks Prepared for the National 
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 4-5 (Dec. 18, 1992).
39
 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1765-69).
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citizen.”40  With time, the frustrations and uncertainties of sorting out the ethical and semantic 
nuances suggested by these phrases may well lead to cynicism41 or, as explored below, political 
opportunism.  
In part because of the absence of distinct and well-defined standards for assessing the 
“goodness” or “badness” of a judge’s professional conduct, it has been possible for Congress to 
craft legislation that substantially affects judicial power and discretion, and that also either itself 
tacitly threatens judges with removal for noncompliance or provides a platform for 
individualized and systematic threats of removal by legislators.  The Feeney Amendment and 
House of Representatives Resolution 568 are two examples of such legislation. 
A. The Feeney Amendment and Its Minatory Provisions
The Sentencing Reform Act of 198442 (SRA) and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines43 are 
certainly nothing new, and it is undisputed that two of the primary motivations underlying the 
Guidelines were the promotion of uniformity in sentencing and the creation of sentences 
40 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 37 (1974).  A similarly undetailed framework for 
understanding what is impeachment-worthy classifies impeachable behavior into two sub-genera: “It [the conduct] 
must violate some known, established law, be of a grave nature, and involve consequences highly detrimental to the 
United States.  In the alternative, it must involve evil, corrupt, willful, malicious, or gross conduct in the discharge 
of office to the great detriment of the United States.”  John Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the 
Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 55 (1970) (but acts that “result from error of judgment or 
omission of duty . . . without the presence of a willful disregard, are not impeachable”).
41
 See, for example, the well-known comment of then U.S. Representative Gerald R. Ford, on the merits of the 
possible impeachment of Justice William O. Douglas: “An impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House 
of Representatives [considers it] to be at any time in history; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses 
two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office.”  
Cong. Rec. 116, daily ed. (April 15, 1970): 11,913.
42
 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998).
43
 The Guidelines were created by the United States Sentencing Commission, whose power emanates from 
Congress.  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989) (holding that Congress’ delegation of legislative 
power to the Commission to create the Guidelines is constitutional).
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proportionate to the crimes committed.44  The Guidelines themselves support these aims.45
Notwithstanding the substantial curtailment of judicial discretion in sentencing ushered in by the 
Guidelines, Judge Bruce Selya has observed that even under the SRA
sentencing is not a matter of mere mechanics.  The various adjustments to the base 
offense level for specific offense characteristics and other factors depend upon a district 
court’s determination of what conduct is relevant to the offense at issue – a matter 
inviting district court discretion . . . . Similarly, district court discretion is summoned, like 
a genie from a bottle, by the long list of factors to be considered in imposing a particular 
sentence, and by the somewhat elastic contours of those factors.  Finally, the departure 
provisions play in the joints of the guidelines structure.46
It seems plausible enough that the SRA and the Guidelines stemmed in large measure 
from the reasonable legislative impetus to promote consistency and diminish individual caprice 
in federal sentencing.  Those laudable purposes were tempered, however, by provisions of the 
SRA permitting judges, in the (regulated) exercise of their discretion, to depart (upward or 
downward) from the Guidelines range for various case-specific reasons.47  Some of these reasons 
44 See Oversight of the U.S. Sentencing Commission: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. On 
Criminal Justice Oversight (2000) (testimony of Sen. Thurmond) (stating that elimination of sentence disparity 
between similarly situated defendants was a primary purpose of Guidelines); Hon. Bruce M. Selya & John C. 
Massaro, The Illustrative Role Of Substantial Assistance Departures in Combating Ultra-Uniformity, 35 B.C. L. 
REV. 799, 801 (1994) (discussing proportionality as an aim of the Guidelines).
45
 See Editorial Note 3, USSG § 1A1.1 (emphasis in original):
To understand these [G]uidelines and the rationale that underlies them, one must begin with the three 
objectives that Congress, in enacting the new sentencing law, sought to achieve.  Its basic objective was to 
enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to reduce crime through an effective, fair sentencing 
system.  To achieve this objective, Congress first sought honesty in sentencing.  It sought to avoid the 
confusion and implicit deception that arises out of the present sentencing system which requires a judge to 
impose an indeterminate sentence that is automatically reduced in most cases . . . .  Second, Congress 
sought uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed by different federal 
courts for similar criminal conduct by similar criminal offenders.  Third, Congress sought proportionality in 
sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of different 
severity.
46
 Selya & Massaro, supra note 44, at 803.
47 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) and Guidelines Manual § 5K2.0.  Section 3553(b) permitted departure if “the court finds 
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
14
were expressly deemed legitimate in all situations,48 while others depended on ad hoc judicial 
assessments.  Appellate courts were empowered to review sentencing departures and overturn 
them if “unreasonable”,49 which the Supreme Court interpreted as appellate review for abuse-of-
discretion.50
The advent of the Feeney Amendment, however, calls into doubt whether the motivations 
of Congress today in controlling the sentencing process bear much resemblance to those of the 
Congress that enacted the SRA in the mid-1980s.  The Feeney Amendment (named after its 
sponsor, first term Representative Tom Feeney of Florida, “who it appears had never before 
expressed any interest or insight into sentencing, federal or otherwise”)51 was enacted as part of 
the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) 
Act (or “Amber Alert”),52 whose essential purpose, the creation of a national reporting system 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different 
from that described.”  The Policy Statement in the Guidelines explaining the operation of this section highlights the 
continuing importance of judicial discretion in the context of departure: “Circumstances that may warrant departure 
from the guidelines pursuant to this provision cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed 
in advance.”
48 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (directing the Commission to “assure that the guidelines reflect the general 
appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed . . . to take into account a 
defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation of prosecution of another person who has committed an 
offense”).
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2).
50 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98-100 (1996) (“A district court’s decision to depart from the Guidelines . . . 
will in most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing 
court.”).
51
 Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1241 (2004).  
52
 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 667-676 (2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742).  The Feeney Amendment 
appears at section 401 of the PROTECT Act.
15
for child kidnappings, has little obvious connection with regulating or curtailing the powers of 
the judiciary.53
Nevertheless, the Feeney Amendment represents the greatest restriction of judicial 
sentencing power since the SRA.  The Feeney Amendment passed through two incarnations.  
The first version (Feeney I) was attached, without any vetting by the House Judiciary 
Committee, the Sentencing Commission, or anyone else in Congress, as a rider to the PROTECT 
Act, and was passed by the House of Representatives with little discussion.  Feeney I dispensed 
with certain express grounds for downward departure (e.g., aberrant behavior, family ties, and 
military service).  But it also altogether eliminated the ad hoc category of downward departure, 
limiting the grounds for departure to those selected factors explicitly listed in the Guidelines.54
Professor Zlotnick has observed that Feeney I’s wholesale abolition of judicial discretion in 
sentencing may well have been catalyzed by the “Judge Rosenbaum Debacle.”55  But the 
confrontation between the House Judiciary Committee and Judge Rosenbaum was, in many 
ways, merely symbolic of the long-standing and pervasively suspicious resentment among 
several in the Committee and in Congress generally that too many judges are “soft on crime” and 
overly prone to depart downward.56  Those suspicions created an opportunity for Congress to 
53
 See the statement of Senator Edward Kennedy (MA), expressing the view that the Feeney Amendment “ha[s] 
nothing to do with children, and everything to do with handcuffing judges and eliminating fairness in our Federal 
sentencing system.”  149 Cong. Rec. S6711 (May 20, 2003).
54 See David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing 
Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 230 (2004).
55 Id. at 225.  U.S. District Judge James M. Rosenbaum of Minnesota, a Reagan appointee and former U.S. Attorney, 
offered various criticisms of drug sentences under the Guidelines before the House Judiciary Committee.  In 
response, he was accused by the Committee of disregarding the Guidelines on several occasions and was threatened 
with a records subpoena.
56 Id. at 226.
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assert its power over the judiciary by implementing new rules that, as I will show below, tacitly 
threaten judges’ job security.
The enacted version of the Feeney Amendment (Feeney II) reflects just that.  Feeney II 
eliminates judicial discretion with respect to unenumerated downward departures for crimes 
involving pornography, sexual abuse, child sex, and child kidnapping and trafficking.57  It also 
makes several substantive changes to sentencing practice as it had developed under the SRA, 
imposing two categories of limitations on judicial discretion which I will call “direct” and 
“minatory.”  The “direct” limitations are the substitution of de novo appellate review for Koon’s 
abuse-of-discretion standard58 and the requirement that a prosecutor make a motion for the last 
point in a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.59  To be sure, these restrictions 
weaken the discretionary power of judges, but they have few psychological overtones or 
implications for judges.  The de novo standard of review expresses a preference for greater intra-
judicial scrutiny of downward departures; it probably will result in more reversals merely 
because appellate judges will be freer to do as they will.60  Whether or not this occurs, the district 
judge is merely on notice that his sentencing decisions, like the majority of his decisions in other 
contexts (e.g., rulings on dispositive motions and essentially any issue of law at any stage in 
57
 PROTECT Act, § 401(a), (b), 117 Stat. 650, 667-68.
58 Id. at § 401(d), 117 Stat. at 670-71.
59 Id. at § 401(g), 117 Stat. at 671.
60
 I have some hesitation with Professor Zlotnick’s conclusion that de novo review will necessarily increase 
ideologically-based reversals.  He argues that “the increasingly conservative appointees on the Courts of Appeals are 
less likely to agree with the district court judges in close cases.”  Zlotnick, supra note 54, at 231.  The present 
administration has appointed notably conservative judges; another President’s appointees may be less so.  There is 
no reason to expect that, as a result of the de novo standard, the downward departure decisions of President Bush’s 
appointees to the district court will be reversed by a future, more liberal President’s appointees to the court of 
appeals.
17
litigation), will be given greater appellate attention.  But there is little reason to believe that this 
finer review would strike fear in the hearts of district judges – de novo review is commonplace 
and unremarkable for lower courts.  Indeed, while it is undeniable that most judges prefer not to 
be reversed, intense judicial peer review is an integral and vital component of the process.  
Similarly, the requirement of a prosecutorial motion to consummate a substantial assistance 
downward departure may curtail a judge’s authority, but it does no more than that.  The motion 
requirement does not forebode any unspoken consequence to the sentencing judge, such as, for 
example, the loss of employment in response to a decision that displeases.  
By contrast, the “minatory” limitations do portend such consequences.  Feeney II requires 
the Chief Judge of each district to submit to the Sentencing Commission “a written report of the 
sentence; the offense for which it is imposed; the age, race, sex of the offender; and information 
regarding several factors made relevant by the guidelines.”61  Furthermore, Feeney II states that 
“[t]he [Sentencing] Commission shall, upon request, make available to the House and Senate 
Committees on the Judiciary, the written reports and all underlying records accompanying those 
reports described in this section . . . .”62  Zlotnick notes that “one cannot really argue that 
Congress should be forbidden from collecting this information,”63 but this overlooks (as well as 
proves) the point.  It is precisely because sentencing data are matters of public record that Feeney 
II’s onerous reporting requirements64 could not represent anything other than a threat to 
61
 PROTECT Act § 401(h), 117 Stat. at 672.
62 Id.
63
 Zlotnick, supra note 54, at 233.
64
 So paperwork intensive is the reporting requirement that in order to comply with it, Judge Donald Molloy of the 
District of Montana issued a “standing order” directing the U.S. Attorney, within twenty days of any particular 
sentencing, to assemble and file with the court clerk a report of the sentence.  United States v. Ray, --- F.3d ---, 2004 
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sentencing judges – essentially, expressing the sentiment, “we’re watching you,” and nothing 
else.65  What is the point of this type of surveillance?  “A tool for intimidation” is one oft-voiced 
answer,66 and it may be that Congress intended the reporting requirement as a bullying device for 
its own sake; by compiling sentencing statistics, Congress may be intimidating judges into 
departing downward less frequently merely to keep Congress happy.  But intimidation is 
generally simply a means to a desired end, and a deeper purpose may therefore exist.  Congress 
has the power to impeach the judge if he does not satisfy, cumbersome as that process may be.   
In fact, Congress’ only constitutional tool of control over the employment of individual, life-
tenured federal judges is the broadsword of impeachment;67 it is not far-fetched to claim that one 
of the most plausible purposes for the reporting requirement, therefore, is to threaten a judge 
WL 1636928, at *1 (9th Cir. Jul 23, 2004).  The Ninth Circuit upheld the standing order as constitutional, and not a 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.  Id. at *12-13.
65
 In response to the “judicial blacklist” argument, Judge Paul Cassell of the District of Utah has called the criticism 
of the Feeney Amendment’s reporting requirement “hyperbolic”: “[T]he overriding fact remains that judicial 
departure decisions (like any other judicial action) are already matters of public record. This court’s sentencing 
decisions, for example, are all easily available both in the court’s public files and on an internet website, 
www.utd.uscourts.gov.”  United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah 2003); see also United 
States v. Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Haw. 2004) (parroting VanLeer).  That sentencing decisions are 
public records and widely available, however, is not logically connected to the conclusion that Congress’ intent in 
imposing the reporting requirement was benign; in fact, just the opposite conclusion is far more compelling.
66
 Zlotnick, supra note 54, at 233.
67
 Though it is not a settled question, it is commonly accepted that an individual judge cannot be removed from 
office except by impeachment.  See Sen. Jeff Sessions & Andrew Sigler, Judicial Independence: Did the Clinton 
Impeachment Trial Erode the Principle?, 29 CUMB L. REV. 489, 506 (1999).  I focus on individual judges because 
Congress has other tools, such as the power to strip jurisdiction, over the judiciary as a whole.  But Congress cannot, 
for example, compel a judge to impose a specific sentence on a particular criminal defendant, notwithstanding its 
injunctions that judges adhere to the Guidelines.  See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (Wall.) 128 (1872) (holding 
that Congress cannot constitutionally direct particular results in given cases).
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with removal from the bench unless he imposes sentences that pass congressional muster (and 
generally, that means sufficiently harsh sentences).68
Feeney II also bars district courts whose downward departures have been reversed (under 
the new de novo standard) on appeal from providing another reason to depart on remand.69
This rule is a clear indication that Congress is not really serious about an accurate application of 
its own Guidelines.70  Judges are given a single chance to depart downward.  The logic seems to 
be that it is categorically suspicious that a judge would elect to use that chance at all; but it 
would be intolerable to permit that judge a second opportunity, even if circumstances are such 
that a correct application of the Guidelines would permit or require it.  Again, the “no seconds” 
rule requires an assessment of congressional motivation.  Since it does not correlate to a more 
accurate system of sentencing,71 the reasons for it must be discerned elsewhere.  One plausible 
explanation for the rule is that it forms a natural extension of the reporting requirement.  Under 
this theory, the rule can be explained by positing that its supporters believe that judges who 
depart downward in a given case and who are reversed are more likely to do so in the same case 
68
 Cf. the comments of Representative Feeney in a recent interview with the Legal Times: “Scrutinizing judges is a 
valid role for members of Congress, [Feeney] said, especially since the Constitution provides only for impeachment 
as a method of punishment.  ‘When your only option is the nuclear option, you’re very limited.’”  Tony Mauro, 
Rehnquist’s Olive Branch Too Late?, LEGAL TIMES, June 1, 2004.  
69
 PROTECT Act § 401(e), 117 Stat. at 671.
70
 This point is made by Professor Miller, who has commented on Congress’ deep dissatisfaction with and “true 
anger” at the Guidelines, in addition to its belief that the Guidelines are overly moderate.  See Miller, supra note 51, 
at 1248.
71
 That the “no seconds” rule is irrational from the perspective of sentencing accuracy is easily demonstrable.  A 
judge who departs downward for reason A, and who is reversed, may realize on remand that reasons B, C, or D are 
also legitimate grounds upon which to depart.  Or, reasons B, C, and D may have become legitimate reasons upon 
which to depart at some point after the first sentencing and before the resentencing.  If reasons B, C, or D are 
improper grounds for departure at the resentencing, the appellate court will reverse using their heightened de novo 
standard of review.  But a judge who is incapable of testing the propriety of reasons B, C, or D runs the (avoidable 
and unnecessary) risk of erroneously applying the Guidelines.
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on remand than judges who did not depart in the first instance.  There is no reason to continue 
collecting sentencing data when a judge has already indicated his inclination to depart once in a 
case; all that remains is to stop him from departing.  There are ways to render the “no seconds” 
rule all but meaningless in practice, but they are not necessarily conducive to a better sentencing 
system.  For example, a district court that is inclined to depart downward now has incentive to do 
so on a large number of grounds, some of which may apply and some of which may not, simply 
to cover all possible avenues that may be foreclosed after remand. 72  Perversely, if adopted this 
practice will artificially pad a judge’s departure statistics; the “no seconds” rule will increase the 
quantity of data contained in the individual reports to Congress, but may not reflect the judge’s 
true inclinations toward departures.
The reaction of federal judges to the Feeney Amendment has, unsurprisingly, been 
overwhelmingly negative.73  Chief Justice Rehnquist himself called it “an unwarranted and ill-
72 See Tracy Friddle, John M. Sands, “Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right”: Remands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
& The Protect Act – A Radical “Departure”?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 541 (2004).  
73 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 51, at 1248-50 (citing angry reactions to the Feeney Amendment in decisions by 
Judge Robert P. Patterson in United States v. Kim, 2003 WL 22391190, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2003), and Judge 
Paul A. Magnuson in United States v. Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1006-07 (D. Minn. 2003) (“This reporting 
requirement system accomplishes its goal: the Court is intimidated, and the Court is scared to depart.”)); In re 
Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (in response to the Feeney Amendment, Judge Jack B. Weinstein 
required that all sentencings be videotaped for appellate review because he felt that the reviewing court should see 
and hear the defendant); United States v. Mendoza, No. 03-CR-730-ALL, 2004 WL 1191118 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 
2004) (Judge Dickran Tevrizian held the reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it allows “individual 
judges to be singled-out, threatened, intimidated, and targeted.”); United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1022 
(D.N.D. 2003) (urging federal judges to speak out against the Feeney Amendment); Brief for Appellant, at 5-6, 
United States v. Thompson, No. 03-3632, 2003 WL 23010704 (8th Cir. 2003) (basis of appeal is the statement of 
Judge David S. Doty of the District of Minnesota, who refused to depart downward in a case because “judges read 
newspapers and watch news broadcasts on television . . . and I think the Court’s under some pressure now because 
frankly I follow the trials and tribulations of my chief judge.  Consequently, I am frankly not going to [depart 
downward].”) (emphasis omitted); United States v. Khan, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2004 WL 1616460, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 20, 2004) (“The Feeney Amendment, among other unsound innovations, prohibits a downward departure unless
the ground for departure was relied upon in the previous sentencing and approved by the court of appeals.”).  
Professor Zlotnick has recently published an article based in part on his interviews with a number of district judges, 
many of whom expressed their dissatisfaction with the Feeney Amendment and the federal sentencing system.  See
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considered effort to intimidate individual judges in the performance of their judicial duties,”74
and even adverted indirectly, in the context of the reporting requirement, to Congress’ looming 
impeachment power.75  Chief Judge William Young (D. Mass.) suggested (only partly 
sarcastically) that the “no seconds” rule was in all likelihood overtly intended to correct the 
waywardness of his own past sentencing practices.76  He also took great pains to make perfectly 
clear that the Feeney Amendment does not intimidate him77 (in contrast to Judge Magnuson (D. 
Minn.), who admits his intimidation)78 and that he continues to have confidence in “the 
David M. Zlotnick, Shouting Into the Wind: District Court Judges and Federal Sentencing Policy, 9 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U.L. REV.  745 (2004).
74
 2003 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, available at www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2003year-endreport.html; see also Gina Holland, Justice Raps Sentencing Rules, Associated Press, March 18, 
2004, available at www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/03/18/justice_raps_sentencing_rules/ (in reaction to 
the Feeney Amendment, Justice Kennedy stated: “The mandatory minimums enacted by Congress are in my view 
unfair, unjust, unwise.”).
75 See supra note 74 (Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: “For side-by-side with the broad authority of Congress to 
legislate and gather information in this area is the principle that federal judges are not to be removed from office for 
their judicial acts.”).
76 United States v. Green, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2004 WL 1381101, at *12 & n.120 (D. Mass. June 18, 2004) (calling 
the Feeney Amendment “the saddest and most counterproductive episode in the evolution of federal sentencing 
doctrine” and observing that the “no seconds rule” was driven by Congress’ “apparent[] disgust[] with the conduct 
of this Court” as set forth in United States v. Bogdan, 302 F.3d 12, 14-15, 17 (1st Cir. 2002), where Judge Young’s 
decision to depart downward for a second time on remand was reversed by the First Circuit).
77
 For another example of judicial bravado on the issue of the reporting requirement, see Tom Perrotta, Panel 
Laments Lack of Judicial Discretion, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 2003, at 1, who reports the comments of Judges Roger J. 
Miner and Chester J. Straub of the Second Circuit in the panel hearing on United States v. Santiago, 76 Fed. Appx. 
397 (2d Cir. 2003).  When the issue of the defendant’s request for a downward departure arose, Judge Miner is 
reported to have stated to the prosecutor: “If we go along with your adversary, you’ll probably take our names and 
report them to the attorney general.”  As the prosecutor responded, Judge Straub interjected: “Be sure you spell them 
correctly.  Especially Straub  S-T-R-A-U-B.”
78 See Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1006-07.  Judge Young reports that Representative Feeney “fired back” a response 
to Judge Magnuson, recommending that he “get out the Constitution, where it’s very clear that other than the United 
States Supreme Court, all of the other federal courts are only established by the will of the United States Congress.”  
Green, 2004 WL 1381101, at n.157 (citing Elizabeth Stawickie, Minnesota Public Radio, Judge Speaks Out Against 
Congress, Ashcroft, Oct. 22, 2003, at 
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/10/22_stawickie_sentencing/).  
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constitutional protections designed to insure an independent judiciary.”79  Interesting, too, are the 
cases of two judges who resigned in protest against the Feeney Amendment and the policies it 
represents.  Judge John S. Martin (S.D.N.Y.), who had vociferously expressed his opposition to 
the federal sentencing system before the Feeney Amendment, stepped down in direct response to 
the Feeney Amendment.80  Judge Robert J. Cindrich (W.D. Pa.) resigned in at least indirect 
response to the new sentencing policies, calling them “morally wrong.”81  While it is surely an 
exaggeration to claim that the Feeney Amendment was the sole cause of these judges’ 
resignations, it is certainly likely (given their uniformly critical comments about federal 
sentencing) that the prospect of enforcing a sentencing system with which they disagreed, and 
the ominous specter of losing their jobs if they did not, motivated these judges’ resignations so 
soon after the passage of the Feeney Amendment.82  In this sense, the distinction between 
resignation and removal may not be especially meaningful.  Professor Van Tassel notes that 
“investigations, threats of investigations, and threats of impeachment can be very powerful tools 
in inducing judges to resign from office voluntarily.”83  If the reporting requirement or the other 
79 Green, 2004 WL 1381101, at *15.
80
 John S. Martin, Jr., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31 (“For a judge to be deprived of 
the ability to consider all the factors that go into formulating a just sentence is completely at odds with the 
sentencing philosophy that has been a hallmark of the American justice system.”).
81
 Associated Press, Federal Judge Rips Sentencing Guidelines as He Steps Down, Feb. 2, 2004, at WL 2/2/04 
APWIRES 07:23:34.
82
 In the same vein, some judges responded to the Feeney Amendment and its “draconian” policies by taking senior 
status and declining to hear criminal cases.  Zlotnick, supra note 73, at 650 & n.15 (citing Richard T. Boylan, Do the 
Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions of Federal Judges?, 33 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 231 (2004) 
(providing statistical support that judges took senior status at a higher rate after the Guidelines became effective)).
83
 Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service – And Disservice –
1789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1993).
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rules imposed by the Feeney Amendment84 create an atmosphere wherein some federal judges 
feel compelled to resign voluntarily, that atmosphere is no less threatening because other judges 
choose to criticize the Feeney Amendment, or simply to endure it without comment. 85
One might imagine that the sentencing context, because it is so inherently inflammatory 
and controversial (as well as so readily politicizable), would be especially conducive to 
increasing conflict between the judiciary and the legislature, and consequently, as this article 
argues, to more frequent threats of judicial removal.  The sentencing sphere, however, is not 
unique.  I contend in the following section that Congress has already found other pockets of 
judicial power and discretion that it covets, and that we should expect more frequent threats of 
removal deriving from Congress’ usurpative urges. 
B. House of Representatives Resolution 568
One year after his success in reshaping the Sentencing Guidelines, Representative 
Feeney, along with Representative Bob Goodatte (VA), introduced a bill on March 17, 2004 
expressing
the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial determinations regarding the 
meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based in whole or in part on 
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign 
judgments, laws, or pronouncements are incorporated into the legislative history of laws 
84
 Though the JUDGES Act, which is presently circulating in Congress, would repeal certain provisions of the 
Feeney Amendment, it is important to note that the reporting requirement would remain effective under JUDGES.  
See Patrice Stappert, A Death Sentence for Justice: The Feeney Amendment Frustrates Federal Sentencing, 49 VILL. 
L. REV. 693, 721 (2004).
85
 The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) held that the judicial facfinding 
procedures called for in the enhancement provisions of Washington State’s determinate sentencing system violated 
the Sixth Amendment.  Whether and how Blakely will affect the constitutionality of the Guidelines remains to be 
seen.  Of course, a finding by the Supreme Court (or other lower federal courts, as has already occurred) that the 
enhancement provisions of the Guidelines are unconstitutional surely will do nothing to improve the tension 
between the two branches; neither, in all likelihood, will Congress’ reaction.
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passed by the elected legislative branches of the United States or otherwise inform an 
understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United States.86
The exception for foreign legal pronouncements that inform the “original meaning of the laws of 
the United States” likely found its way into Resolution 568 – also called the “Reaffirmation of 
American Independence Resolution”87 – because it was perceived that barring citations to 
Blackstone,88 Edmund Burke, or the King’s Bench was not exactly what the House had in 
mind.89  Rather, the House was obviously disturbed by what it viewed as a rash of Supreme 
Court decisions in which the Justices relied on the statements and opinions of (modern-day) 
European judicial and legal authorities.90  The Hearing Statement on Resolution 568 of 
Representative Steve Chabot lists disapprovingly Lawrence v. Texas, wherein Justice Kennedy in 
his majority decision relied on a decision of the European Court of Human Rights;91 Atkins v. 
Virginia, in which Justice Stevens in his majority opinion cited to an amicus brief filed by the 
86
 H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (hereafter “Resolution 568”).
87
 Jeffrey McDermott, Citation to Foreign Precedent: Congress vs. The Courts, 51-JUL FED. LAW. 20 (2004).
88 See Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n., 123 S. Ct. 470, 154 L. Ed. 2d 359 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
denial of certiorari) (citing Blackstone approvingly but criticizing the views of the Supreme Court of Canada as, 
since “foreign,” presumptively suspect): “[T]his court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign 
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”
89
 Moreover, the wholesale disapproval of all foreign pronouncements would have been highly impractical, as it 
would have impugned the scores of Supreme Court decisions relying on such precedents.
90 See Hearing Statement of Representative Chabot, Committee on the Judiciary, March 25, 2004, available at 
www.house.gov/judiciary/chabot032504.htm. 
91
 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481-83 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)).  
The European Court of Human Rights is “[a]uthoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe 
(21 nations then, 45 nations now).”  Id. Dudgeon did not follow Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) on the 
issue of the right of homosexuals to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.  As noted by Representative Chabot, in 
his dissent Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s citation to “foreign views” as “meaningless” and “[d]angerous 
dicta . . . .”  
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European Union;92 and Grutter v. Bollinger, in which Justice Ginsburg cited in her concurrence 
to an international treaty – the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination.93  Congressman Chabot states his belief (and, presumably, that of the 
sponsors and proponents of Resolution 568) that “Americans are subject to the decisions of a 
United States Supreme Court that are based, at least in part, on selectively cited decisions drawn 
from a variety of foreign bodies.”94
Resolution 568 is an attempt to limit and disavow the presence of exogenous legal 
influences in judicial decisions, and as such it is a rather petty and xenophobic concept; 
statements of law and policy that come from other nations, of course, never bind U.S. courts; 
when they are included in American decisions (which is not often), they are used merely for their 
persuasive value – to note that an argument originates with a particular foreign source, to support 
an argument with a certain line of foreign reasoning, or to show how an American view 
compares with other world views.  In any case, there is no logic to the contention that an 
argument loses its persuasive force because it originated outside of our national geographic 
bounds.  
But beyond the knee-jerk provincialism that Resolution 568 represents, it is also a 
manifestation of Congress’ will to power in another area traditionally reserved to the judge – the 
92
 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (“Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for 
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.  Brief for European Union as 
Amicus Curiae 4.”).  Justice Stevens also cites to numerous research studies in support of his conclusions, but he 
does not specify whether these contain foreign data.  Nor is there any indication from the House whether it would 
find non-U.S. academic studies suspect.
93
 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  It is worth noting that the United States ratified the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1994.
94 See Statement of Representative Chabot, supra note 90.
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sources cited in and supporting judicial decisions.  The putative bill would expressly permit 
reliance on foreign sources if they had been “incorporated . . . into the legislative history of laws 
passed by the elected legislative branches . . . .”  This exception gives rise to several inferences.  
First, it indicates that the bill’s supporters are not so much disturbed by the inclusion of foreign 
precedent per se as they are about the citation to foreign precedent with which they either are 
unfamiliar or disagree.  Second, the solution proposed by Resolution 568 is not the wholesale 
disapproval of foreign precedent; rather, it is a reservation to Congress of the power to handpick 
which foreign precedent is appropriate for consideration and inclusion in judicial decisions.  The 
reappearance of Representative Feeney as an advocate both of further restrictions on the powers 
of the judiciary (this time far outside the sentencing realm) and, as explained below, of the use of 
threats of impeachment in response to anticipated judicial noncompliance suggests that the 
House (or at least some of its members) is motivated by something other than a real interest in 
the subject matter of its lawmaking.  What it wants is greater control over the judiciary, 
irrespective of the substantive context.  
It is true that Resolution 568 is still in its larval stage – there is no indication yet about its 
prospects for maturation in the House or Senate, let alone of its appeal to the President.  
Moreover, even if passed, it merely would express Congress’ “sense” of disapprobation for the 
practice of reliance on non-sanctioned foreign sources; there is nothing in the bill as presently 
constituted that speaks of consequences for disobedience.  Nevertheless, incredibly, it has 
already been suggested by Representative Feeney that judicial disregard for Resolution 568’s 
“sense” could be cause for removal from the bench.95  This is archetypal of the use of the threat 
95 See Mauro, supra note 68, quoting Congressman Feeney: “In discussing the resolution, Feeney suggested that 
invoking foreign precedents – increasingly popular from the Supreme Court on down in recent years – could be an 
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of impeachment as an instrument of political coercion: few may agree (Representative Feeney, of 
course, excepted) that the decision to cite to a foreign decision or legal statement is grounds for 
removal.  It is certainly not a high crime or misdemeanor.  But is it “bad” behavior?  Citation to 
foreign precedent would certainly (assuming Resolution 568 becomes law, and, to a lesser 
degree, even if it does not) be controversial, since it would openly defy the legislative will.  
Moreover, while a judge who cited to a foreign precedent in the face of Resolution 568 might not 
expect impeachment to follow hot on the heels of his decision’s publication, he might do so with 
trepidation because he would know that Congress would “disapprove” of him and would be on 
the lookout for other, similar peccadilloes.  And, perhaps in such a scenario, multiple and 
repeated citations to foreign precedents would, over time, raise sufficiently important eyebrows 
to result in formal inquiries.96  Such recurring acts of defiance might not be “good behavior”; 
following the model of Judge Baer, threats of impeachment would be the likely congressional 
response.97
impeachable offense.  Sensenbrenner, in his Judicial Conference speech, cited Feeney’s resolution favorably.”; 
McDermott, supra note 87: “The resolution’s sponsor even raised the possibility of impeaching judges who continue 
to cite foreign precedent.” 
96
 Or, the judge’s decision to flout the legislative will might prove costly when opportunities for elevation arise.  See
Hon. Guido Calabresi, The Current, Subtle – and Not so Subtle – Rejection of an Independent Judiciary, 4 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 637, 643-44 (2002): “The real danger . . . is that if judges think about promotion, they are going to start 
being very careful not to make waves.  If you are a district judge and you want to get on the court of appeals, it does 
not help to have senators of the right or the left criticizing your opinions . . . .”
97
 Congressman Feeney is an especially illuminating case study because he obviously favors threatened removals as 
a useful mechanism of judicial control.  See Hearing on the FY 2004 Department of Justice Budget Request, (Apr. 8, 
2003), 2003 WL 1849408 (F.D.C.H.).  In response to a situation in which Judge Royce C. Lamberth (D.D.C.) was 
considering contempt sanctions against Deputy Assistant Attorney General Stuart Schiffer, Congressman Feeney, 
though openly admitting that he knew nothing of the case, commented:
[U]ltimately, in separation of powers issues, you’re [the Executive branch] probably not in the court of last 
resort in terms of Article I powers . . . . But I . . . like Article I, especially now that I’m in Congress, and it 
seems to me that, at a minimum, Congress has the right to set the jurisdiction of federal judges harassing 
several dozen members of the Justice Department.  It seems to be something that we could effect with our 
jurisdictional powers . . . . And then, ultimately, of course, there’s the question of judge’s good behavior.
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Several members of the House Judiciary Committee have expressed views that reinforce 
the argument that control over the judiciary, rather than mere disdain for foreign legal 
pronouncements, is the true force driving Resolution 568.  For example, Representative Feeney 
stated:
One of the problems we have with importing foreign law that’s never been ratified by any 
of the political branches, the elected branches, is that judges have enormous discretion . . 
. . And how is a judge . . . to discern which of the countries[’ decisions] is appropriate to 
cite and which . . . is not. . . . . They [the courts] are not competent to do so.98
This refrain was repeated by Representative Steve King (IA) who made it clear that Resolution 
568 is only the first step in what he feels should be a grand and far-reaching program of stripping 
away judicial power:
The Constitution gives the Congress the authority and the responsibility to establish . . . 
the separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial branch of government . . 
. .[W]e have this activist court that’s taken over so much authority from the legislative 
branch . . . . So we’ve got a lot of work to do here, and I don’t know that we have to do it 
in a radical fashion.  I think we need to do it in a step-by-step fashion, this being step one, 
to send this resolution to limit the courts to the directions that Mr. Feeney has described . 
. . and I think we need to follow along with that and do a number of other things to 
brighten this line of the separation of powers.99
This separation of powers argument is not quite ingenuous.  Congress has never been charged 
(constitutionally or otherwise) with selecting which legal precedents the courts may use to 
interpret the law or to support the reasoning of their decisions.100  But by claiming that it is the 
judiciary that is usurping a historically legislative power, Representative King was able to invoke 
98 Hearing on H.R. Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 108th Cong. 112 (Mar. 25, 2004), 2004 WL 
598895 (F.D.C.H.). 
99 Id.
100 See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound 
and interpret that rule.”).
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the sacred cow of separation of powers to support a general program whose first step is 
Resolution 568 – allegedly to “brighten this line [of the separation of powers].”  Ironically, 
Resolution 568 itself represents a blurring of the separation of powers because it is a move by 
Congress to absorb a traditionally judicial function.  More importantly, however, in 
Representative King’s view, is that the Resolution may be the first sown seed in what will flower 
into a comprehensive system of control over the judiciary.  
Representative Goodlatte’s comments specifically concern the enforcement of Resolution 
568 (i.e., what happens to judges who disregard Congress’ “sense”), but also reflect a wider 
interest in increasing the penalties and consequences for judges who resist the new tide of 
changes that resolutions such as 568 represent:
And one of the issues that is underlying this resolution, and, I suspect, future clashes . . . 
between Congress and the judiciary, is the question of whether the founding fathers . . 
really placed in our Constitution enough checks and balances on this [judicial] power or 
whether it’s simply a failure of the Congress and the executive branch to act in response 
to the acquisition of power that has taken place on the part of our judiciary . . . .
So I would question . . . what measures the Congress could take to effectively exercise 
that system of checks and balances that is so clearly contemplated in our Constitution 
against abuse of power.
Clearly, we’ve never removed anybody from office for misinterpreting, in our view, a 
section of the Constitution, and, clearly, we have never taken the steps that have been 
discussed by others, and perhaps we could, but they are very difficult steps.  Are there 
other things that we should be looking at to check unbridled power on the part of the 
courts?101
One of the “other things” that is already being done is to threaten judges with removal.  The 
possibility inheres in Representative Goodlatte’s musing that “perhaps we could” use removal as 
an instrument of punishment, despite the “difficult[y]” of the endeavor to effect an actual 
101 Supra note 98.
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impeachment.  Indeed, Representative Adam Schiff (CA) compared Resolution 568 to the 
reporting requirement of the Feeney Amendment, observing that both (“in combination”)102
might “have a chilling effect on the independence of the judiciary.”103  One may well ask why 
Congress should bother to pass a law that expresses its position on the question of citation to 
foreign law if judges are free to reject that position without fear of adverse consequences.  In her 
testimony before Congress on Resolution 568, Professor Vicki Jackson referred directly to the 
threat of removal as an undeniable presence hovering over the resolution:
What concerns me, Mr. Chairman, about a collective resolution from the House of 
Representatives is the fact that the Congress, of course, controls, to some extent, the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  The Congress is also the body empowered to impeach 
and remove from offices the justices.
And my concern is that a resolution of this nature begins to trench on the courts with 
respect to the interpretative process, and, if there is anything that I would think was a core 
judicial function for the courts, it is how to interpret.  And so it is those factors that lead 
me to be very concerned about the proposed resolution . . . .
I want to raise a grave caution about the idea that the impeachment power ever would be 
used because of disagreement with a decision.104
Representative Nadler (NY), commenting on Representative Feeney’s statements about the 
“ultimate remedy” for judicial noncompliance with Resolution 568, was more direct: “In other 
102 Id.
103 Id.  The comparison was made in the form of a question to Professor Jeremy Rabkin, who did not answer it.
104 Id.; see also statement of Representative Schiff that “[w]e are shooting across the bow [of the judiciary] when we 
threaten to subpoena the records of Judge Rosenbaum who comes before the panel and expresses what’s an 
unpopular opinion with the panel.  We shoot across the bow when we use the word ‘impeachment’ in reference to 
the citing of foreign opinion . . . . [T]hat we have decided to showcase this issue, attack this, I think, is part of a 
broader and more disturbing trend that is probably more significant than these isolated references to foreign 
opinion.”
31
words, we’re threatening impeachment if we disagree with the court.  That is the definition of 
intimidation.”105
I do not wish to confuse (too much) the issue of the propriety of citation to foreign legal 
sources with my principal point – that Congress’ interest in limiting such citations is actually 
driven by a larger, overarching desire to strip away traditionally judicial functions and to gain 
greater control over the judiciary, and that it will threaten judges with removal to meet those 
ends.  Certainly, there are legitimate arguments to be made for and against the use of foreign 
legal opinion in American caselaw.  For example, Professor Harold Koh has suggested that 
“transnationalist jurisprudence,” whose champions on the current Court he believes are Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer, is a “venerable” judicial approach practiced since the birth of the republic 
and which “assumes America’s political and economic interdependence with other nations 
operating within the international legal system.”106  Likewise, Professor Bodansky observes that 
the knowledge of and respect for international law is a long-standing American tradition, and
that the Supreme Court historically has often looked to international law in construing the 
powers of the federal government.107  “In contrast to today,” he writes, “I am not aware that 
when the Court, in these earlier cases, paid a decent respect to the opinions of mankind, this was 
criticized as illegitimate or otherwise un-American.”108  Others have disagreed, arguing that 
105 Id.
106
 Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 53 (2004); see also Harold 
Hongju Koh, Paying Decent Respect to International Tribunal Rulings, 96 ASIL Proc. 45, 53 (2002).  Professor 
Koh contrasts the “transnational” approach with “national jurisprudence,” favored in his view by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas.
107 See Daniel Bodansky, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
421, 423 & n.13 – 16 (2004).
108 Id. at 426.
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“[i]ncluding a new source [international law] fundamentally destabilizes the equilibrium of 
constitutional decision making,”109 or that the selective use of international materials “serves as 
mere cover for the expansion of selected rights favored by domestic advocacy groups, for 
reasons having nothing to do with anything international.”110  Judge Posner has recently 
presented four grounds for his conclusion that citation to foreign sources as persuasive argument 
should be avoided.111  At least some of these reasons are, in my view, problematic,112 but all of 
these arguments, pro- and con-, do not speak directly to a congressionally imposed categorical 
rule disallowing, with sanctioned exceptions, the inclusion of foreign sources in American 
109
 Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 58 (2004).
110
 Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. 
J. INTL L. 69 (2004).
111
 Richard Posner, Argument: Could I Interest You In Some Foreign Law?  No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own 
Laws.  The Court Should Never View A Foreign Legal Decision As A Precedent In Any Way, 2004-AUG LEGAL 
AFF. 40 (2004).
112 See e.g., Judge Posner’s “first problem” – that “according precedential weight to foreign or international 
decisions” offers “promiscuous opportunities” for citation.  Id. at 41.  Judge Posner brings to bear the generally 
accepted rule against citing to unpublished decisions, believing it to be sound “because those opinions receive less 
careful attention from the judges than the ones they publish.”  But there is no necessary parallel with foreign 
decisions here.  A rule categorically forbidding citation to foreign decisions does not discriminate between, on the 
one hand, decisions pored over by foreign judges and intended by them as precedent-setting and, on the other, the 
foreign equivalent of the unpublished decision.  Of course, judges wishing to cite, for example, to Italian precedent 
should be familiar with the difference in precedential value between the decisions of, say, la Corte di cassazione, la 
Pretura, and la Corte d’assize.  Once a certain background knowledge is established, however, foreign precedent 
could add desirable nuance to the analysis of many issues in American law.  See Vicki Jackson, Argument: Could I 
Interest You in Some Foreign Law?  Yes Please, I’d Love To Talk With You, 2004-AUG LEGAL AFF. 43 
(“Understanding references to foreign law in their legal and historic context should defuse unwanted criticisms, 
highlight the benefits of well-informed uses of foreign and international legal sources, and focus attention on some 
genuinely difficult questions.”).
Judge Posner’s second problem – that in order to cite foreign decisions credibly, American judges would 
have to possess a profound knowledge about the socio-political history of the country in question, as well as that 
country’s historical approach to the issue in question – suffers from the same type of flaw as his first problem.  
There is no reason to suppose that American judges, at all levels, have the sort of broad cultivation with respect to 
American socio-political history that Posner would require.  Nevertheless, when confronted with particular issues to 
decide, judges often educate themselves about the background of their particular legal question.  Why should they 
not seek as broad-based an education as possible?  
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judicial decisions.  The selected statements of the House members provide a better understanding 
of the motivations undergirding Resolution 568 than do the academic musings about the 
desirability of using foreign sources.  And those legislative expressions demonstrate that 
Resolution 568 is widely intended merely as one small stage in what many Congressmen hope 
will be a far-ranging program of absorbing judicial power.  
I have examined two legislative programs (the Feeney Amendment and Resolution 568) 
that strip federal judges of powers they traditionally held and I have argued that their sponsors 
and proponents are prepared to threaten judges with removal for noncompliance.  But there are 
several other examples of “jurisdiction stripping” bills that have been enacted and will be 
introduced in the coming terms.  With the defeat in the Senate of the constitutional amendment 
banning gay marriage, Representative John Hostettler (IN) introduced legislation that would bar 
federal courts from hearing lawsuits, even lawsuits raising constitutional issues, related to 
homosexual sex and marriage.113  This bill passed in the House on July 22, 2004,114 and House 
Majority Leader Tom DeLay (TX) has “told reporters . . . that he plans to use ‘jurisdiction 
stripping’ measures to achieve other policy goals as well,” including proposed legislation to 
prevent federal courts from hearing lawsuits related to the words “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance and, though he believes the time is “not quite ripe,” eventually to the issue of 
113
 Jonathan E. Kaplan, New GOP Gay-Ban Tactics; Court Powers Could Be Taken Away, Says Majority Leader, 
THE HILL, July 15, 2004.  This legislation reflects another fledgling congressional tactic of judicial control, one that 
Representative Hostettler seemed to advocate in the hearing on Resolution 568, as he posed the following question 
to Professor Jackson: “You’re not familiar with the elimination of jurisdiction from the Supreme Court, the power, 
for example, of the purse not to fund the enforcement of decisions by the court and others[?]”  See supra note 98.
114
 Mary Fitzgerald & Alan Cooperman, Marriage Protection Act Passes; House Bill Strips Federal Courts of 
Power Over Same-Sex Cases, WASHINGTON POST, July 24, 2004, at A4.
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abortion.115  Obviously, the constitutionality of such measures is an unknown quantity.116
Nevertheless, these bills and others of similar stirp very much represent the type of pervasive 
program envisioned by Representatives Feeney, King, Goodlatte, Chabot, DeLay and many 
others.117  In the face of this “jurisdiction stripping” legislation, judges will have three options: 
acceptance, criticism, or resignation.  If the Feeney Amendment and Resolution 568 are any 
guide, judges who choose the second approach should expect Congress to threaten them with 
removal for their opposition.118
115
 Kaplan, supra note 113.
116 See Editorial: Muzzling the Courts?, WASHINGTON POST, July 21, 2004, at A18: “[F]oes of same-sex marriage 
are back with another radical proposal.  This time they are pushing a bill that would prevent federal courts from 
hearing challenges to a federal law that limits gay marriage . . . . Making the attack all the more ominous is House 
Majority Leader Tom DeLay’s stated intention to promote similar bills to bar court challenges to the Pledge of 
Allegiance and, potentially, on other social issues . . . . Just how far Congress can go in preventing judicial 
consideration of its actions is a thorny constitutional question.” 
Congress may very well be vested with the power to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over many of 
these issues, since the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction only extends to “cases affecting ambassadors, other 
public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  Moreover, 
as many in the House Judiciary Committee are fond of repeating, the Constitution vests Congress with the power to 
“ordain and establish” the inferior federal courts.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.   Whether, once established, 
Congress could limit these courts’ jurisdiction (or abolish them altogether) is another question.
117 See supra note 98, Statement of Representative Chabot: “We’ve not taken the step of using our authority under 
Article I, Section 8, for example, or to alter the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article II, Section 
2.  That step might be appropriate in the future . . . .”  
In fact, Congress has already taken that step in other contexts.  See Charles G. Geyh, Judicial 
Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the 
Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 155 (2003) (“Members of Congress have introduced legislation to strip the federal courts 
of jurisdiction to hear cases on politically sensitive subjects, and Congress has gone so far as to enact procedures 
limiting the opportunity for federal court review in such areas as habeas corpus proceedings, immigration, and 
prisoner rights litigation.”); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the 
Future of the Federal Courts – Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998) (“In 1996, 
Congress enacted several laws restricting the jurisdiction and remedial powers of the federal courts across a range of 
litigation brought by prisoners and immigrants.”).
118
 Of course, I do not claim that this movement in the House of Representatives sprang into being just in the last 
year.  But I do believe it to be the development of something that is less than a decade old.  See Geyh, supra note 
117, at 154 (“Majority Leader and Presidential candidate Bob Dole, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, and 
House Majority Whip Tom DeLay advocated impeachment and removal as a remedy for judges they characterized 
as activist.”); see also Judicial Misconduct and Discipline: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual 
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III. Two (Interrelated) Explanations for the Phenomenon
What can explain the present pervasiveness of congressional threats of removal against 
judges?  The question is complex and its answers are likely numerous – too many, in fact, for the 
space and scope of this article.  Part of the explanation lies in the indeterminacy of possible 
conduct encompassed by the “good behavior” clause, which has been directly invoked by 
Congressman Feeney as the standard by which judicial removals should be assessed.119  Political 
ideology, of course, jumps out immediately as a plausible motivation, and, in the case of the 
legislation I have examined, it is conservative political ideology (harsher penalties for criminals 
and a reflexive distrust of foreign legal thought) that seems to predominate.  In fact, some have 
argued that conservatives have seethed at least since the Warren Court era – i.e., “from the 
Miranda ruling to the recent decision overturning the Texas sodomy statute” 120 – about the 
purported liberalism of the judiciary.  It is no accident, after all, that the vast majority of 
Congressmen sponsoring and supporting the Feeney Amendment, Resolution 568, and the 
various jurisdiction stripping measures are staunch conservatives, as are those who seem most 
Property of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 8 (1997), Statement of Representative Bob Barr (GA): 
“It is time to start exploring how and in what way we might take steps to ‘rebalance’ and restore integrity to our 
Federal justice system.  This includes, but is not limited to, exploring the manner in which the constitutional tenure 
for judges to hold their office during ‘good behavior’ can be fully effectuated to take into account the consequences 
for misbehavior – a problem plainly presented to the American people by the assumption of power beyond the scope 
of the office.  There are . . . a number of ways that the problems of judicial activism or overreaching[] can be 
addressed: defining “good behavior;” limiting tenure of judges; limitations on the jurisdiction of judges and 
impeachment.” 
Jurisdiction stripping bills were certainly not unheard of in earlier decades but very few of them were 
enacted.  See Thomas I. Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of the Federal Judiciary, 46 VILL. L. REV. 
745, 770 (2001): “It has been reported that, between 1953 and 1968, more than sixty pieces of legislation were 
introduced in Congress to restrict federal court jurisdiction over particular matters . . . [but] these efforts were 
unsuccessful . . . .”  Jurisdiction stripping, therefore, as an effective congressional mechanism of judicial control, is 
of relatively recent vintage.
119 See Curry, supra note 7.
120 See Zlotnick, supra note 54, at 250.
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inclined to threaten removal for disregard of their ideological viewpoints.  There is surely some 
truth to the contention that conservative ideology is one of the forces driving the current 
congressional hostility toward the judiciary.
But conservative ideology alone is an insufficient explanation.  Congressional Democrats 
have been extraordinarily active in preventing President Bush’s judicial nominees from 
ascending the bench, and that, too, is a kind of antagonism toward the judiciary.121  The vitriolic 
tenor of these appointment battles is no less high pitched than in the contexts I have discussed, 
and, irrespective of one’s political feelings, liberal ideology is the constitutional impediment, as 
it has been at many other times in the past.122  To this argument it may properly be responded 
that it is not conservative or liberal ideology, but ideology generally, that is to blame for the poor 
state of relations between the judicial and legislative branches.  This position requires us to ask 
121
 At no time in American history has the Senate been more active in blocking presidential appointees to the federal 
appellate bench.  See Review & Outlook (Editorial): The Filibuster Express, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 21, 2004, 
at A10 (“Democrats began their seventh filibuster of a Bush judicial nominee yesterday.  No Senate has ever 
filibustered a President’s appellate-court nominee before, but never mind.  Watch for the number of filibusters to hit 
double digits by September . . . . John Kerry and John Edwards missed the . . . vote, but their support of the filibuster 
tactic is well-established -- a fact that will boomerang against their nominees if they win this fall . . . .”); see also
Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Judicial Selection as War, Part Three: The Role of Ideology, 15 REGENT U.L. REV. 15 
(2003).
122
 Professor Friedman has argued that historically both liberals and conservatives have attacked the judiciary on 
substantive grounds.  See Barry Friedman, ‘Things Forgotten’ in the Debate Over Judicial Independence, 14 GA. 
ST. U.L. REV. 737, 738 (1998): “[C]ontrary to the impression many seem to hold today, throughout history attacks 
on the judiciary have come from both sides of the political spectrum.  Today, it seems to be conservatives who are 
attacking judges, but for many years liberals sat in the critic’s chair.”  
The labels “conservative” and “liberal” are also of questionable value with respect to identifying and 
opposing a particular judicial philosophy.  See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial 
Restraint to the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 637-39 (2002): “In the coming years, we 
can expect characterizing judicial ideology in the traditional terms of ‘conservative,’ ‘liberal,’ ‘activist,’ or 
adherence to ‘judicial restraint,’ to be of only limited utility.  The first reason is ideological drift.  In the world of 
constitutional law there are few fixtures . . . . Second, the fragmentation of liberalism has produced confusion and 
uncertainty about what exactly a contemporary ‘liberal’ judge would favor . . . . Moreover, . . . we can expect further 
fragmentation of conservatives.  Splits likely will arise not only in how conservatives prioritize sources of 
constitutional authority, but also exacerbate divisions among libertarians, social conservatives, moral skeptics, and 
those who favor property rights and natural law.”
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what is intended by “ideology.”  If we accept that one definition of ideology is “the ways in 
which meaning establishes and maintains relations of power,”123 then it becomes critical to 
examine the way in which the legislature and judiciary share and compete for power to arrive at 
an answer to the question.  With this definition in mind, I offer what is surely an incomplete list 
of two other explanations for the prevalence of congressional threats of removal against the 
judiciary – one theoretical and the other social – that, when taken in tandem, may make some 
sense of the current state of affairs.
A. The Threat as Rational in the Contest for Power Among the Legislative and
Judicial Branches
One might reasonably suppose that no judge has ever been impeached, tried, and 
removed who was not first threatened with removal.  If that claim is accepted, one might ask 
why anyone should be troubled by the act of threatening judges with removal; that threat, after 
all, is simply the first link in the chain that eventually results (or does not) in the removal of a 
judge from the bench.  Impeachment and conviction without an antecedent threat to do so may 
well be a logical impossibility.  But what if the threat to remove a federal judge were, as a rule, 
uncoupled with removal itself?  In this situation, there would be few impeachments (as there are 
now), but frequent public, vocal threats of removal.  Is this a probable occurrence?  
123
 Patricia Ewick & Austin Sarat, Hidden in Plain View: Murray Edelman in the Law and Society Tradition, 29 
LAW  & SOC. INQUIRY 439, 455 (2004) (citing JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE (1990)).  
This definition, I recognize, has a bit of the Marxian about it.  See Emery G. Lee, The Federalist in an Age of 
Faction: Rethinking Federalist No. 76 On the Senate’s Role in the Judicial Confirmations Process, 30 OHIO N.U.L. 
REV. 235, 244 (2004): “Many  . . . meanings [of ideology] emphasize the role of ideas in legitimating class or group 
interests.  Karl Marx, for example, used the term to denote ‘any ideas, however unsophisticated, that g[i]ve apparent 
validity and assumed authority to the claims that members of different classes might make when they pursue their 
various interests.’”  Other definitions are possible, but in my view, these are less interesting and offer less in the way 
of explaining the prevalence of threats of removal.  See, e.g., id. at 244-45 (defining “ideology” alternatively as “a 
complete constellation of political ideas that explains political and social phenomena and provides a roadmap for 
political change”).
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I would argue that one basis for the use of the threat as an instrument of social and 
political control was first developed by Thomas Hobbes.124  Following Professor Robin West, I 
set out (“[j]ust to refresh recollection”)125 a passage of Hobbes’ Leviathan to frame my 
contention:
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in attaining our Ends.  And 
therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both 
enjoy, they become enemies; and in this way to their End, (which is principally their own 
conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy or subdue one 
another . . . .
For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets 
upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, 
as far as he dares . . . to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and 
from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell.  First, 
Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
The first maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety, and the third, for 
Reputation . . . . [T]he third, [makes men violent] for trifles, as a word, a smile, a 
different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by 
reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.126
It has been argued that the relationship between individuals in competition for power described 
by Hobbes has important implications in the context of employment discrimination.127  “To deny 
124
 Others have used the term “threat expert” to describe Hobbes.  See Martin Krygier, Walls and Bridges: A 
Comment on Philip Selznick’s The Moral Commonwealth, 82 CAL. L. REV. 473, 479 (1994) (book review).
125
 Robin West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 119, 131 (2003).
126 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 184-85 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968) (1651).  This tract immediately precedes 
Hobbes’ most well-known description of the life of man in a state of nature (“solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and 
short”).
127 See Richard H. McAdams, Epstein On His Own Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 241, 248 (1994) (“We arrive 
then at a respectable and obvious Hobbesian argument for at least some employment discrimination laws: that to 
preserve social peace, members of one race should not be allowed to “dishonor” members of another race by certain 
acts of discrimination.”).  Title VII has also been criticized on the basis of its allegedly Hobbesian assumptions.  See
Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Impact of Hobbes’ Empirical Natural Law on Title VII’s Effectiveness: A Hegelian 
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employment . . . to those that seek it, is to Dishonour,”128 and it is to be expected that many 
things which men desire and for which they compete and strive in the working world, either with 
fellow employees or with their employers (“trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion”), will 
drive men to violence (in the broad sense intended by Hobbes)129 to obtain them.  Only the 
“imperative law,” backed by threat of retribution for non-compliance,130 can guard against the 
natural inclinations of the employer toward preserving and expanding the ken of its control over 
the employed.  Hobbesian “Honour” does not depend upon morality or whether an action is 
abstractly “just or unjust”, but instead “consisteth onely in the opinion of power.”131
The connection I would draw to the relationship between our legislative and judicial 
branches is the following.  The legislator and the judge perpetually vie for power, in that the 
judge applies and/or critiques (by striking down) the law created by the legislator in ways that 
the legislator may not have intended, nor perhaps ever conceived, and the legislator reacts by 
recreating the law to suit his intention.  In this manner, though the two operate on rather different 
planes, each branch exerts influence and is in a position of substantive oversight as to the other; 
thus, built into the political framework is the concept that neither branch wholly trusts the other 
Critique, 25 CONN. L. REV. 607, 615-17 (1993) (arguing that Title VII would be more effective if it “reflect[ed] a 
person’s inner subjectivity.”).
128 HOBBES, supra note 126, at 154.  Professor McAdams has suggested that though Hobbes likely did not intend 
“employment” in the modern business sense, “he meant that certain means of ‘dealing’ with others bestowed honor 
on them, while parallel refusal to deal with them bestowed dishonor.”  McAdams, supra note 127, at n.25.  
129
 McAdams offers a convincing claim that Hobbes’ reference to “violence” is not limited merely to “literal 
combat,” but instead should be read to encompass “[s]tatus ‘warfare’” or status competition.  Richard H. McAdams, 
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 1003, 1075 (1995).
130 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 16 (1961).  
131 HOBBES, supra note 126, at 156.
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to fulfill its obligations and each always suspects that the other will overstep the bounds of its 
powers given the right opportunity.132  The conditions are ideal for Hobbes’ mutual 
“diffidence.”133  In addition, however, the legislator is vested with the power to remove the judge 
– in essence, the legislator retains the employer’s power of job termination in respect of the 
judge – while the judge is neither reciprocally authorized to remove the legislator nor, for that 
matter, retains any control at all over the legislator’s job tenure.134  It is a short step to conclude 
that since he is in competition with the judge, and since he also has the power of impeachment, 
the legislator qua employer will use threats of removal (i.e., job termination) against the judge –
thereby “dishonouring” the judge – in order to gain “glory” in the form of additional coveted, 
substantive powers formerly possessed by the judge and influence over the judge’s decisions.  
The conclusion is fortified by the reality that Congress’ impeachment decisions, unlike all of its 
132
 The close interaction between the legislative and judicial branches in modern times, and the mutual mistrust such 
closeness invariably breeds is well described by Professor Geyh.  See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, 
Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1223, (1996) 
(“If the prevailing view in Congress becomes that judges cannot be trusted to take principled, public-spirited 
positions in the legislative process, it is a short, logical step to say that they cannot be trusted to administer their own 
affairs or to decide cases in a principled, public-spirited manner, thereby necessitating heavy-handed oversight by 
the political branches.”).  Geyh argues that the traditional separation-of-powers paradigm that governs the 
legislative-judicial relationship has changed considerably since the early 1970s; judges are now much more involved 
as lobbyists and advocates for legislative change (particularly in statutory reform and rulemaking) than was once the 
case.  Id. at 1168-71.  This position adds strength to the claim that with an increased intertwining of branch roles 
will come a concomitant struggle for influence in overlapping spheres.
133
 Hobbes’ “diffidence” is a fear about one’s own sense of security, which in turn impels an individual to act 
meanly toward his fellows in order to achieve a type of self-reassurance about his position.  See supra note 126, at 
184 (“And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as 
Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power 
great enough to endanger him[.]”).
134
 Once the President nominates a judicial officer, the legislator (this time the Senate) also has another 
‘employment’ power viz-à-viz that nominee: the power to hire (appoint).  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  And when 
the nominee is confirmed Congress has the additional employment power of raising pay.  Article III, section 1 
ordains that judicial compensation “shall not be diminished.”  Increases in judicial compensation, however, are 
within the legislature’s bailiwick.  See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 220 (1980) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 
79 (Alexander Hamilton), pp. 491-92 (1818) (“It was therefore necessary to leave it to the discretion of the 
legislature to vary its provisions in conformity to the variations in circumstances; yet under such restrictions as to 
put it out of the power of that body to change the condition of the individual [judge] for the worse.”)).      
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legislative functions, are sui generis in that they are not subject to any kind of review,135 as well 
as by the fact that judges have no tools with which to resist.  In this sense, it is misleading to 
speak of the constitutional framework as comprised of three separate, co-equal branches, because 
the legislature’s power of job termination over the judiciary threatens to trump all other divisions 
of power between those two branches.  
Hobbes’ views of the costs of a divided sovereignty are familiar; he clearly believed that 
only the state unified under a single and unchallenged power could avoid the type of ‘inter-
branch’ conflict inevitable in all other governmental forms.136  It is not necessary, however, to 
accept Hobbes’ centralized autocratic solution (and the relative powerlessness he envisions for 
his judiciary) in order to agree that his statement of the problem of shared governmental power 
has important implications for our constitutional system.137  Isaak Dore suggests that the 
constitutional division of power between the executive and judicial branches creates just such 
conflict because “[u]nder a Hobbesian view, the most important issue is not whether the question 
is answered correctly, but that it be answered decisively.”138  Thus, according to Dore, executive 
135
 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lessons of Impeachment History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 603, 604 (1999) 
(“[I]mpeachment judgments are, for all intents and purposes, final.  Their legitimacy turns on the public’s 
acceptance of Congress’s actions and ultimately the judgment of history.”); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 
231 (1993).  
136 See HOBBES, supra note 126, at 236 (“[A] kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand.”); see also Carl T. Bogus, 
The Battle for Separation of Powers in Rhode Island, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 67, 87 (2004) (stating that Hobbes 
opposed the idea of separation of powers).  Consistent with this view, incidentally, Hobbes believed that judicial 
officers should be subordinate to the sovereign – his “ministers” – and were not to be charged with any power to 
control the sovereign.  HOBBES, supra note 126, at 291, 294.
137
 On the relevance of Hobbes’ underlying themes in Leviathan – i.e., “Hobbesian harms” described in the state of 
nature – to various pockets or aspects of modern social practices and relationships (including those governed by the 
“Rule of Law,” and therefore outside Hobbes’ state of nature), see West, supra note 125, at 146-147.  
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 Isaak Dore, Inter-Branch Conflicts Under the Constitution of the United States: A Comment on Professor 
Goldstein’s Paper, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 853, 857 (1999).  
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review of judicial constitutional interpretation is “a step away from definitiveness in 
decisionmaking and hence problematic for social stability.”139  If that is true, there is even more 
reason to believe that similar conflicts will arise in the legislative / judicial relationship.  
Assuming that Congress is interested in both (1) creating laws that reflect the will of its 
constituents (that the “question is answered correctly,” under Dore’s formulation), and (2) 
legitimating and expanding the scope of its own law-giving and other powers while 
contemporaneously conveying to the public that its decisions are final and unassailable (“that 
[the question] be answered decisively”), its use of the impeachment threat against judges is a 
perfectly rational choice – one which arguably would conduce to greater social stability in that 
ultimately it would centralize judicial power (or some judicial power) in the legislature. 140  It is 
no answer, moreover, that “[t]o construe the impeachment power to enable Congress to penalize 
or threaten federal judges because of nothing more than disagreement with their substantive 
decisions would . . . unnecessarily upset the balance of branch power.”141   That may well be 
true.  But it raises the possibility that Congress’ second posited aim – an increase in the scope of 
its powers with respect to those of the judiciary – might ultimately conflict with and overcome its 
first aim – the fulfillment of its legislative responsibility.
“Threat theory” is a term that could be used to characterize the psychological pressures 
attending the judicial / legislative relationship described above.  Indeed, despite the visceral 
139 Id.
140
 H.L.A. Hart emphasizes a similar point when, commenting on the thought of Hobbes, he states that the 
sovereign’s authority is intended “to preclude or cut off any independent deliberation by the hearer of the merits of 
pro and con of doing the act.”  H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 253 (1982).
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  Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the Constitution: A Textual and Structural 
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moral reaction generally evoked by the word “threat,” the threat and its purposes are more 
rationally understood as merely an “actor’s credible communication of interest, capacity, and 
contingent intention . . . designed to forewarn another actor that if it does not desist from or 
adjust certain behavior, more destructive instruments will be applied.”142   In the context of 
threats of removal from the bench, what makes such threats effective is not the actual prospect of 
impeachment, but instead the fear of the possibility (however actually remote) of removal – “the 
exploitation of potential force.”143  To a significant degree, therefore, it matters psychologically 
much less whether or not the threat of impeachment is carried out than that it was made at all.  
As Professor Cross has observed:
If Congress and the courts are playing a game of “chicken” to control doctrine, one does 
not need an actual car crash to demonstrate an effect from the threat of impeachment . . . 
.The threat of impeachment has significance even beyond face value and beyond the 
particular judge threatened with impeachment.  A threat may form a part of the complex 
interaction of relations between legislature and judiciary.  It may simply be a form of 
signaling legislative displeasure with doctrinal action and may carry the veiled threat of a 
variety of other attacks on the Court . . . . Threatening impeachment is effective in that it 
targets a particular judge or decision that has aroused Congress’ wrath and informs the 
Court about congressional preferences on a particular issue and their relative salience.144
Given both the power structure between the legislative and judicial branches, and the approach 
taken by many in the House of Representatives in pushing forward particular agendas, there is 
every reason to suppose that as those programs are met with judicial resistance, judges should 
expect threats of removal from the legislature with increasing frequency.
142
 W. Michael Reisman, Assessing the Benefits of Nonmilitary Enforcement: The Case of Economic Sanctions, 89 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC 337, 351 (1995).
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But there is nothing novel in such a theory – Hobbes, after all, wrote well over a century 
before the republic’s founding, and judges and legislators have had intercourse and disagreement 
ever since.  If threat theory can plausibly explain the reasons for legislative use of threats of 
removal against judges, it cannot account for an increased prevalence of such threats in today’s
legislative / judicial relationship.  Only a theory that identifies something distinctive about the 
modern state of affairs will suffice for that purpose.
B. Culture of Criticism: The Political Consequences of Overabundance
Judge Posner has observed that “[e]xceptionally able judges arouse suspicion of having 
an ‘agenda,’ that is, of wanting to be something more than just corks bobbing on the waves of 
litigation or umpires calling balls and strikes.”145  His metaphor applies to the exceptionally able 
and the ordinary alike, and illustrates the general public diffidence about the capacity of judges 
to make decisions that will be respected and recognized as legitimate.  That distrust has political 
consequences.  I would argue that Congress has seized upon an increasing public faithlessness as
to the legitimacy of the grounds upon which judges judge in order to advance its own political 
ends.  In short, Congress has recognized that public criticism of the judiciary not only has 
become more prevalent and popular than ever before, but that it is also unlikely to diminish.  
Congress has and will continue to capitalize on this widespread cultural embrace of judicial 
criticism as a social virtue in order to increase the scope of its powers over the judiciary – which 
is the real aim of legislation such as the Feeney Amendment and Resolution 568.    
In a recent article entitled “Culture of Quiescence,” Professor Carl T. Bogus argues that 
there is “a strongly enforced taboo within the Rhode Island legal culture against criticizing the 
145 RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 110 (1995).
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state’s governmental institutions, particularly its courts.” 146  Though he concentrates specifically 
on Rhode Island, his larger theme (and what is of interest here) deals with the necessity of 
subjecting the judiciary at large to constant and vociferous criticism.  “People who are overly 
protected from criticism,” he contends, “come to a bad end,” and no public servant is more likely 
to suffer from a lack of regular inoculations of public criticism than the judge.147  Lawyers 
dealing with judges “bow and scrape,” law clerks are “awestruck,” and only few brave souls 
muster the gumption to “tell a judge she is wrong.”148  The eventual result of such pervasively 
fawning treatment, Bogus argues, is the manifestation of “black robe disease,” whose symptoms 
– impatience, disdain, cantankerousness – are brought on by the judge’s belief in his own 
omniscience.149
Bogus’ basic point is that the judiciary needs more critics and more outspoken, 
unabashed criticism – “a healthy debate on the merits” of the individual decisions judges 
make.150  Such criticism, which is in vast undersupply in his view, is vitally necessary because 
“an institution that cannot tolerate criticism is inherently unhealthy.  A lack of criticism leads 
inevitably to distorted self-perceptions.  An institution that cannot hear criticism will lose 
opportunities to correct errors and improve . . . .”151  Similar points about the value of lawyer 
criticism of the judiciary have been made by Professor Monroe Freedman, who claims that 
146
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151 Id. at 394.
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lawyers “are particularly knowledgeable about judges’ conduct, and are therefore in a position to 
inform the public about abuses of judicial power.”152  For Bogus, the present state of affairs is a 
general systemic malady:
[T]he problem is not limited to the federal district court.  This is a problem in the wider 
professional culture – a culture that equates disagreement with confrontation, institutional 
criticism with ad hominem attack, and anything that even smacks of personal criticism 
with contemptuousness.  These are self-defeating responses . . . . Federal district judges . . 
. are well armored against a critic’s arrows.  They have life tenure.  They do not need to 
worry about the next election; the ebb and flow of popularity need not concern them.  
Indeed, popularity cannot, and should not, concern them at all . . . . Hypersensitivity to 
criticism is counterproductive.  As everyone understands, thin skin is a characteristic of 
the insecure.153
There are, of course, numerous generally accepted truths about the value of criticism: that 
one should be willing to listen to criticism; that criticism, properly understood and assessed, 
stimulates and promotes self-improvement; that those who are unwilling to hear criticism do 
themselves a disservice, and so forth.  Criticism is also rightly valued from the perspective of the 
speaker.  The freedom to criticize at will is a hallmark of an open society.  We value uninhibited 
criticism for what it represents about our capacity to tolerate differing views, even if we 
recognize that those views vary greatly in worth.  Bogus argues that these bromides about the 
unassailable righteousness of criticism apply wholesale to the judiciary, but does little in the way 
of explaining why criticism is so very necessary for the improvement of the judiciary as an 
institution or for individual judges; he simply accepts the proposition that criticism is of 
152
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unquestionable value, and chastises judges for being overly sensitive to it (and lawyers for not 
doing enough of it).
In fact, superabundant criticism is not an unmitigated good; to argue otherwise is not to 
take a realistic and complete view of criticism’s power.  Alongside the bevy of criticism’s social 
virtues should be listed several of its negative qualities and consequences: criticism is 
destabilizing; criticism can corrode institutional foundations; criticism can be self-serving, mean-
spirited, lacking in depth, and motivated by something quite other than the improvement of the 
criticized.154  These darker sides to criticism are just as germane as its legitimate benefits to a full 
understanding of criticism’s social impact.  
The more substantial point, however, is that the destructive power of criticism is of 
particular relevance to the judicial institution.  Judges are charged to resolve disputes – in effect, 
to put an end to the exchange of critical and opposing points of view – and their authority is 
premised in large measure on the perceived legitimacy of their decisions.  I say “perceived” 
because whether or not a particular decision is ultimately correct (i.e., “based on the law,” if that 
is capable of definition) or even fair is not necessarily the most vital measure of the judicial 
institution’s strength.  Rather, the judiciary is most successful in fulfilling its duties when the 
public whom it serves believes profoundly in the authority of judges to make decisions that will 
affect the public, even if adversely.  When that authority is too much tarnished, or disprized, or 
criticized, it becomes impossible for judges to perform their function, and, indeed, for a society 
154 See James Boyd White, Free Speech and Valuable Speech: Silence, Dante, and the “Marketplace of Ideas”, 51 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 799, 813 (2004): “The standard ideology of free speech assumes as its model an independent-
minded individual who is speaking unwelcome truths to the world, resisting power, and competing with others in an 
open market that will test both fact and value.  It is with such speakers that we easily identify; it is they whose right 
to say what we detest we would die to defend.  But very little speech that makes up our shared world takes this form.  
Rather, the bulk of our public speech is commercially and politically driven . . . .”
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to have judges, because the respect necessary to legitimate decisions ceases to exist.  If judges 
are sensitive to criticism, it should not automatically be supposed that “black robe disease” is 
setting in.  That sensitivity is instead at least as readily attributable to the especially problematic 
role that criticism of a particular judge plays in the weakening of the judicial institution in the 
eyes of the public.  
Bogus cites to a tract from Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, but the passage he offers does not clearly support his 
argument: “The [Supreme] Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and 
perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what 
the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.”155   The public perception of the 
Supreme Court’s legitimacy is not driven by society’s general understanding or approbation of 
the decisions reached by the Court.  It does not, therefore, depend on the public’s satisfaction 
155
 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (emphasis mine).  The context for the quote is a discussion of the problems of 
perceived legitimacy that attend overruling prior Supreme Court precedent.  Justice O’Connor continued: “Some 
cost will be paid by anyone who approves or implements a constitutional decision where it is unpopular, or who 
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More in keeping with Bogus’ position are these comments of Justice Black: 
[T]he assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism 
wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion.  For it is a prized American privilege to speak 
one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions.  And an enforced 
silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably 
engender resentment, suspicion and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941).  Justice Black, an avowed First Amendment absolutist, see 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 274-75 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that “the First Amendment, with the 
Fourteenth, ‘absolutely’ forbids [laws that abridge free speech] without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts’ or ‘whereases’”), most 
assuredly believed in the beneficent power of criticism.  But just as there are less than altruistic reasons to give 
criticism, there are similarly cynical reasons to accept it.  It is in a judge’s self-interest to profess his receptivity to
criticism; it gives the judge an aura of openness and strength that a professed sensitivity to criticism would not.  The 
flaw in Justice Black’s reasoning is that the degree of resentment, suspicion and contempt a society feels for its 
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that the Court’s legal conclusions are sound, or that its holdings are well-reasoned, rhetorically 
persuasive, or analytically comprehensive.156  If criticism of this kind is to be offered, it is the 
law scholar, practicing specialist or judge that is in a position to do so, because such criticism (if 
it is worth listening to) requires not only a reaction to the result reached, but also, and more 
importantly, the technical and educational background to assess the reasoning and argument 
deployed to reach the result.157
Instead, the public perception of judicial legitimacy, when it exists, stems from a deep-
seated, historic trust that the Supreme Court (or any other court) is correct because it is the 
Court, and therefore the final and most credible voice on the law.158  To return to Hobbes, “[i]t is 
judiciary does not necessarily correlate inversely to the amount of criticism leveled against the judiciary.  
Conversely, a society that heaps criticism on its judiciary does not thereby demonstrate its greater respect.  
156
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not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a law.”159  Without an intrinsic cultural faith in the 
‘rightness’ of the judiciary, borne of the traditional place in the collective consciousness of the 
judiciary as the final authority over matters legal, courts cannot maintain their lofty status in the 
perception of those whom they serve but who often may not understand what they do.160  And 
this remains true irrespective of how receptive courts may be to criticism – even criticism whose 
aims are purely altruistic – of the decisions they reach in any given case or circumstance.161
Too easily does Bogus dismiss the damage that criticism can inflict on the judiciary: 
“[t]hey have life tenure . . . . Courts can take care of themselves.”162  Life tenure, as we have 
seen, is one of the mechanisms that renders rather procedurally complicated the process of 
ousting a judge by impeachment and conviction.  I would hazard that for most judges, the 
security of life tenure is not a narcotic that numbs the sense of responsibility to perform one’s 
offices properly, nor is it remotely sufficient, of itself, to guarantee a well-functioning 
invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for their constitutional 
ideals.” (emphasis mine).
159 THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND
55 (Joseph Cropsey ed. 1971) (1681).
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judiciary.163  It is true that life tenure is one of the few constitutionally prescribed prophylactics 
supporting the judiciary’s independence.  But that does not mean that the constitutional 
justifications for judicial independence are necessarily circumscribed by arguments to be drawn 
exclusively from the “good behavior” clause.  Proponents of this type of purely textualist 
understanding of judicial independence “posit[] the existence of a constitutional scheme so 
incomplete that the capacity of individual judges to decide cases without intimidation, and of the 
judicial branch to preserve its institutional integrity, is left to dangle by the thread of legislative 
sufferance – a state of affairs that is difficult to reconcile with the framers’ emphatic support for 
judicial independence.”164  Moreover, for Bogus to cite life tenure, in isolation, as a reason that 
we should not worry or care about the state of the judiciary highlights his inherently combative 
perspective: he seems to be advocating some kind of cultural upheaval within the legal 
profession and society at large against the judiciary.165  It is difficult to see how this type of 
criticism would do much to improve the judicial institution, though it would certainly increase 
social fragmentation, hostility, polarization and resentment. 
163
 The successful judiciary requires a good deal more tending.  Professor Redish has divided the concept of 
“judicial independence” into three categories: “institutional independence,” “judicial/lawmaking independence,” and 
“countermajoritarian independence.”  See Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and 
Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 698 (1995).  Tenure protection is only one facet of “institutional 
independence.”  See also  John A. Ferejohn, Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 965 (2002) (“Everyone agrees that we need ‘decisional 
independence,’ meaning judges’ ability to adjudicate facts and interpret law in particular cases ‘free from any 
outside pressure: personal economic, or political, including any fear of reprisal.’”) (citing Archibald Cox, The 
Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 565, 566 (1996)).  
164
 Geyh, supra note 21, at 161.
165
 Bogus, supra note 146, at 396 (“Rhode Island and her citizens would benefit from culture change . . . . Rhode 
Island lawyers live in a culture in which criticism is considered professional treason . . . . Lawyers must become 
critics . . . . There is strength in numbers . . . . The state needs Rhode Island lawyers to be public critics of those 
aspects of the judicial system they find wanting.  From the many comments made to me, I know that Rhode Island 
lawyers recognized that their professional community is plagued by the taboo against criticism.  Many have told me 
they are happy that there is now a law school in the state to critique the judiciary.  My colleagues will do their part, 
but it is a mistake to count on us alone.”).
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Whether or not one agrees that criticism of the judiciary is unqualifiedly desirable, it is 
something else again to accept the contention that we live in a society and an era where such 
criticism is in insufficient supply.  In fact, this is not the case at all – criticism of individual 
judges and the judiciary generally is in great abundance.  There are numerous surveys reporting 
on the public’s discontent with judges and the state of the judiciary;166 the national debate rages 
like never before on the importance and proper parameters of judicial independence and 
accountability, with arguments for and against criticism of the judiciary and individual judges 
abounding; 167 bar associations and other attorney organizations have formed commissions in 
166 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent With Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective On Civil 
Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 872 (1997): “During the past several decades there has been an increase 
in research exploring the subjective evaluations of those people who deal with the legal system . . . . Recent public 
opinion polls provide evidence that dissatisfaction with the legal system is widespread and that the public generally 
holds lawyers and judges in low regard . . . . For example, during the period of 1972 to 1987, only 30-40% of 
Americans were found to express ‘a great deal of confidence in the Supreme Court as in institution of government’ 
(National Opinion Research center, General Social Survey).  Further, on the local level, the public is found to 
express widespread dissatisfaction with local courts, in particular the criminal courts . . . . For example, national 
surveys indicate that between 1970 and 1990 around 80% of adult Americans indicated that the courts are ‘too 
lenient’ on criminals.  The public faults the courts on a variety of grounds, including the failure to control crime, too 
much leniency, letting too many criminals escape on ‘technicalities,’ making too many erroneous judgments, and 
giving defendants too many rights (e.g., the exclusionary rule).  While these grievances are directed at issues of 
criminal law, there is no evidence that the public distinguishes the handling of criminal and civil cases.”; American 
Bar Association Report on Perceptions of the United States Justice System, 62 ALBANY L. REV. 1307, 1321 (1999) 
(surveying public opinion with respect to a variety of issues including numerous questions on attitudes and beliefs 
about the judiciary, and finding that “50% of the respondents said they are confident or extremely confident in the 
Supreme Court [but] [i]nterestingly, only 34% said the same of the federal courts.”); Geyh, supra note 132, at 1167: 
“Throughout this assault [beginning in the 1970s] on the competence and credibility of the first two branches of 
government, the judiciary has maintained a low profile and escaped relatively unscathed.  That, however, may be 
changing.  In the wake of public frustration with the management of the Rodney King and O.J. Simpson trials, 
commentators have begun to suggest that post-Watergate cynicism is finally catching up with the judiciary.”
167
 Law school symposia and conferences in the past ten or so years alone on the many and complex facets of 
“judicial independence” and “judicial accountability” are too numerous to list in full.  See, e.g., the University of 
Richmond Allen Chair Symposium 2003: Independence of the Judiciary (2003); Ohio State University’s 
Symposium on Perspectives on Judicial Independence, Accountability, and Separation of Powers Issues (2003); the 
University of Pennsylvania’s Conference on Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: Developing an 
Interdisciplinary Research Agenda (2004); Fordham University’s “Special Series: Judicial Independence”; the 
University of Southern California’s Judicial Independence and Accountability Symposium (1998); Georgia State 
University’s Symposium on Judicial Review and Judicial Independence: The Appropriate Role of the Judiciary 
(1998); Hofstra University’s Symposium on Judicial Independence (1997); the University of Dayton’s Symposium 
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response to the tidal wave of public criticism directed at judges and have issued a host of reports 
on the state of public confidence in the judiciary;168 the media have taken an unprecedentedly 
aggressive role in criticizing judges and their decisions;169 and judges themselves have become 
far more outspoken critics of their colleagues than ever before.170
on International Law and Judicial Autonomy (1996); Mercer Law School’s Symposium on Federal Judicial 
Independence (1995); the University of Pennsylvania’s “Disciplining the Federal Judiciary” series (1993).
There is even a separately published bibliographical collection of materials (listing scores of books, 
articles, reports, etc.) that treat judicial independence and accountability.  Many of these deal with the proper role of 
criticism of judges and the judiciary.  See Amy B. Atchison, et al., Judicial Independence and Judicial 
Accountability: A Selected Bibliography, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 723 (1999).  Surely scores more have accreted since 
1999, as evidenced by the extraordinarily rich quantity of recent scholarship in this area.
168 See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Judicial Div. Lawyers Conference & Special Committee on Judicial Independence, 
Response to Criticism of Judges (1998); Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Separation of Powers and Judicial 
Independence, Report: An Independent Judiciary – Executive Summary (1997): “A new cycle of intense political 
scrutiny and criticism of the judiciary is now upon us . . . . If Congress and the courts do not cooperate in a 
constructive and restrained manner, public confidence in the judiciary will be adversely affected . . . . Public support 
for the judicial system is perceived to be in a dangerous state of decline.”; Boston Bar Ass’n Judicial Response Task 
Force Report (2003): “Over the past several years, judges in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as well as around 
the country have come under increased criticism in the media and among members of the public for their decisions 
and orders.  This denigration of the courts undermines the public’s respect for our judicial system, and is often based 
on a misunderstanding of either the judicial process or the facts of a particular case.”; 2 Panels to Review Criticism 
of Judges, N.Y.L.J., September 30, 1996, at 2; D. Dudley Oldham & Seth S. Andersen, Commentary: The Role of 
the Organized Bar In Promoting an Independent and Accountable Judiciary, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 341, 341-42 (2003): 
“The organized bar has a long history of promoting an independent and accountable judiciary.  Lawyers and judges 
have led efforts to improve judicial selection methods, establish codes of conduct and ethics, and promote public 
trust and confidence in the judiciary . . . . Lawyers and judges have also taken the lead at the state and federal levels 
in designing and administering rules and programs to promote accountability of judges to the public they serve.  Bar 
polls, judicial performance evaluation programs, and codes of conduct and ethics for judges are just a few examples 
of the means by which lawyers seek to temper the independence of the judiciary with a healthy and appropriate dose 
of accountability.”  
Bogus himself speaks admiringly of the Philadelphia bar as willing “to speak out collectively and publicly 
about perceived problems in the administration of justice, whether by the courts or other instruments of 
government.”  See Bogus, supra note 146, at 353.   
169 See, e.g., MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION, AND INCOMPETENCE ON THE BENCH (1998) 
(Boot, a writer for the Wall Street Journal, offers a plethora of often contemptuous criticism against an assortment of 
judges); Mark Kozlowski, THE MYTH OF THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE RIGHT IS WRONG ABOUT THE COURTS
(2004), and Richard E. Morgan, Grasping At Straws, CLAREMONT REVIEW OF BOOKS, Summer 2004, at 53 (book 
review of THE MYTH OF THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE RIGHT IS WRONG ABOUT THE COURTS): “Readers of 
this journal are familiar with the withering criticism, more acute every year, directed at judicial adventurism that has 
been, since the Warren Court, a growing pathology in American governance.”; Patrick M. Garry, The First 
Amendment in a Time of Media Proliferation: Does Freedom of Speech Entail a Private Right to Censor, 65 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 183, 187 (2004): “With respect to the electronic media, much of the First Amendment case law has 
been based on a concern with scarcity . . . . To address this concern for scarcity of voices, the marketplace metaphor 
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We are at a considerable distance from Bogus’ lamentable state of an imperious, scornful, 
and craven judiciary whose decisions are shielded from criticism at every turn by an obsequious, 
servile public.  Our condition is much more convincingly described in a recent article by Justice 
Margaret Marshall of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.171  In analyzing the effects of 
Bridges v. California,172 where the Supreme Court overturned contempt sanctions imposed on a 
labor leader and a newspaper that had publicly criticized the judge’s decision in a pending case, 
Justice Marshall observed that
American jurisprudence concerning scandalizing the court departed sharply from the path 
of English common law.  It has never looked back.  With what consequences?  On the 
most tangible level, Bridges and its progeny have allowed the live practice of justice to 
unfold before the American people in all of its raw immediacy and sometimes 
manipulative theatricality.  Press conferences on the courthouse steps, in front of a 
mountain of microphones, are now common fare on American newscasts.  Our airwaves 
crackle with programs that purport to bring gavel-to-gavel trial coverage to the public.  
Instant telephone polls and Internet chat rooms augment the telecasts, allowing viewers to 
was applied.  However, lost in all the obsession with scarcity was the reality of what was taking place within 
America’s media.  An overload of consumer information and entertainment was drowning out just the kind of 
political and public affairs dialogue the First Amendment values most.”  
Whether or not one agrees with Professor Garry, the quantity of media coverage, and criticism, of the 
judiciary (written and oral decisions, conduct on and off the bench, qualifications for appointment, personal habits, 
etc.) is staggering.  In addition to the profusion of coverage in the print media, electronic media has exponentially 
increased the quantity of reporting and criticism of matters judicial.
170 See generally William G. Ross, Civility Among Judges: Charting the Bounds of Proper Criticism By Judges of 
Other Judges, 51 FLA. L. REV. 957, 958-72 (1999).  Professor Ross writes that criticism of judges by other judges 
has recently increased in four distinct areas: “bilious written opinions”; “public comments about specific judges or 
their decisions”; criticism of particular courts; and private comments about fellow judges.  In the context of judicial 
elections (which occur in 38 of 50 States), the Supreme Court has removed essentially all impediments to free 
speech for judicial candidates.  See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that 
a state forfeits its interest in the appearance of an impartial judiciary when it decides to elect its judges; 
consequently, they must permit judicial candidates to exercise their full free speech rights under the First 
Amendment).  Judicial campaign speech and reciprocal criticism of candidates for elected judicial office is in 
plentiful abundance.  See, e.g., Penny J. White, Preserving the Legacy: A Tribute to Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, 
One Who Exalted Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 615 (2004); Geyh, supra note 156, at 49-50. 
171 See Margaret H. Marshall, Dangerous Talk, Dangerous Silence: Free Speech, Judicial Independence, and the 
Rule of Law, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 455 (2002).
172
 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
55
vote on, among other things, whether the accused should be found guilty.  The coverage 
is not only national but international . . . .
But more important than feeding America’s voyeuristic, ‘prurient culture’, Bridges and 
the cases that have built on it have laid the American judiciary open to the unrelenting 
scrutiny of the public, which, more often than not, means the scrutiny of the media.  
Some of this criticism has been polite and restrained; some quite the opposite.173
Though it surely is true that criticism of the judiciary did not suddenly rear its head in the last 
twenty years, the advent of technologies that carry critical commentary with increasing speed is a 
phenomenon of the later half of the twentieth century.  “More information technology offers not 
only more speech but more ways to deliver that speech.”174  By virtue of these advances in 
communication, there is more criticism of the judiciary simply because there are more people 
with access to it, and therefore more people doing and responding to it.175  Thus, criticism of the 
judiciary has expanded to a much broader range of listeners and participants than has ever before 
been the case; moreover, this expansion is not mirrored by a concomitant increase in public 
understanding of the judicial function;176 and the result has been, at one and the same moment, a 
general coarsening177 and exponential intensification of, respectively, the quality and quantity of 
judicial criticism.
173
 Marshall, supra note 171, at 458.
174
 Garry, supra note 169, at 187; see also Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 
(1995) (arguing that the “infobahn” made possible by new technologies will “democratize the information 
marketplace – make it more accessible for comparatively poor speakers as well as rich ones – and diversify it”).
175
 Garry, supra note 169, at 194.
176 Id. at 208: “Nor has the abundance [of speech and criticism made possible by the media] automatically led to a 
more informed and analytical citizenry, nor to a greater diversity of viewpoints.”
177
 Again, I would emphasize that I do not claim that all criticism of the judiciary is undesirable, and I recognize that 
certain criticism is helpful and to be solicited.  My point is that the sheer volume of judicial criticism (of all kinds) 
for its own sake is of debatable social and institutional value.
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What political consequences, if any, follow from this overabundance of public criticism?  
Congress, surely, has not been oblivious to the increased prevalence and perceived desirability of 
unfettered judicial criticism.  The congressional measures discussed in this article (and surely 
many others that aim to curtail judicial powers) purportedly are rooted in the public’s suspicion 
toward and resentment against the judiciary.178  In fact, the terrain of public opinion has never 
been more fertile for the congressional power-plays exemplified by legislation such as the 
Feeney Amendment and Resolution 568.  It is the popularity and profusion of judicial criticism, 
peaking, as it has, relatively recently, that has enabled Congress to brandish its impeachment 
powers against the judiciary with far less restraint than it once could have.  Thus, this culture of 
criticism renders possible (or at the very least greatly facilitates) Congress’ deployment of threat 
theory against judges.  More than the advancement of any particular set of beliefs 
(“conservative” or “liberal”), it is the combination of widespread, public criticism and the 
legislative will to control the judiciary by stripping away and absorbing traditionally judicial 
functions that motivates Congress’ threats of removal against judges – itself an acute form of 
judicial criticism.
178 See Sensenbrenner Remarks Before the U.S. Judicial Conference Regarding Congressional Oversight 
Responsibility of the Judiciary, 150 Cong. Rec. E425-03 (Mar. 23, 2004) (Congressman Sensenbrenner states that 
the Feeney Amendment “represents a legislative response to a long-standing congressional concern that the 
Sentencing Guidelines were increasingly being circumvented by some federal judges,” and emphasizes Congress’ 
oversight responsibilities as the rightful duty of the “elected representatives of the people”); Hearing on H.R. Res. 
568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 108th Cong. 112 (Mar. 25, 2004), 2004 WL 598895 (Congressman 
King roots the impetus for Resolution 568 in the public’s disaffection with the judiciary by asking: “If we are going 
to go down the path of . . . judicial activism, that sees the future of America in a way that’s not accountable to the 
voice of the people, like we have to be – if we go down that path, what does the Constitution mean?”).
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It is at this juncture that one might well ask what can be done to improve matters.179
Justice O’Connor’s observations about the dim state of relations between the judicial and 
legislative branches, the starting point for this article, are not encouraging.  Many (and judges 
especially) urge that greater “education” is the panacea.  According to this view, if the public is 
to have confidence in the judiciary, serious and wide-ranging pedagogical reforms are in order: 
the public must be informed (and kept knowledgeable) about the role of the judiciary, its place in 
our government, the rules governing the conduct of judges, and so on.180  With apologies to 
deliberative democracy enthusiasts,181 I am skeptical of this claim.  Advocates of this type of 
179
 Another question, “Should congressional threats of removal against the judiciary be of any concern?”, is also 
worth considering.  However, since the aim of this article is to establish that such threats are increasing in 
prevalence and that the state of relations between Congress and the judiciary will continue to deteriorate as a result, 
that question will not be addressed here.  
180 See, e.g., Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer Criticism of 
Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703, 727 (1997) (“[T]he time has come for the justice system insiders to take a much 
more aggressive role in the area of public education and public relations.  We need to find ways to work with the 
media, with the public at large, and with the school population.”); Hon. Bruce M. Selya, The Confidence Game: 
Public Perceptions of the Judiciary, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 909, 913 (1996); Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Courtroom With a View: Building Judicial Independence With Public Participation, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & 
DISP. RESOL. 13, 14 (2000); Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial 
Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1064 (2002) (former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice 
White contends that the public must become more active in “gathering information about judicial performance from 
the citizen’s point of view”).  Justice O’Connor seems to advocate a didactic approach toward legislators: “Try to 
make a friend out of Congress . . . . Try to help them understand the needs of judges.  It’s much harder to turn a cold 
shoulder on someone you know.”  See supra note 2.
181
 Much has been written about the role that public deliberation and debate plays (or should play) in the democratic 
process.  See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
DEMOCRACY 17, 21 (Thomas Christiano ed. 2003): “The deliberative conception of democracy is centered around 
an ideal of political justification.  According to this ideal, justification of the exercise of collective political power is 
to proceed on the basis of a free public reasoning among equals . . . . Not simply a form of politics, democracy, on 
the deliberative view, is a framework of social and institutional conditions that facilitates free discussion among 
equal citizens – by providing favorable conditions for participation, association, and expression – and ties the 
authorization to exercise public power (and the exercise itself) to such discussion – by establishing a framework 
ensuring the responsibility and accountability of political power to it . . . .”; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, ch. 4 (2003).  Judge Posner identifies and examines two democratic models: 
“Concept I Democracy” is the deliberative model set forth by Professor Cohen; and “Concept II Democracy” – the 
model he favors and believes best describes American democracy today – which is characterized by a more realistic 
and pragmatically oriented view of public self-interest and the elitism of elected officials in the democratic process.  
Id. at 143-145.  
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public education are grossly oversimplifying matters.  There are parallels with other social 
institutions and professions (medicine, the law, government, education, business, etc.) that make 
this plain.  I and surely many others recognize that the siege of public criticism is not endemic to 
the judiciary alone (though it may be more nocent to the judiciary than other institutions).  Is the 
answer to the public crisis of confidence in its physicians (and the resultant prevalence of 
medical malpractice lawsuits, exorbitant insurance costs, and the other problems afflicting 
modern medical care) to “educate” people about what doctors do, or about the basics of 
molecular genetics or neuropathology, or, even less plausibly, about the sundry and intricate 
possibilities attending the various proposals for a viable American health care system?  Surely 
not.  Such an educational program is both impracticable and of questionable desirability.182  The 
public, after all, has many other valuable pursuits to occupy its time (earning a living and 
consuming goods (thereby contributing to the health of the economy), raising and educating 
children, enjoying well-earned leisure moments, and so on).183  The type of public education that 
would truly make a difference (i.e., that would meaningfully inform the non-physician public 
about medicine and keep it sufficiently knowledgeable and in step with the rapidly changing face 
Interesting as these arguments are for the place of communal deliberation and public criticism in the 
strengthening (or weakening) of the judiciary, see, e.g., JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT, ch. 3 (2001) (describing the inherent tension between judicial review and the 
deliberative model), their examination must await a future article.
182
 It also “hopelessly exaggerates the moral and intellectual capacities, not only of the average person but also of the 
average official (including judge) and even of the political theorists who seek to tutor the people and the officials.”  
POSNER, supra note 181, at 144.  Furthermore, it underestimates the complexity of the subject matter.  In order to 
achieve anything approaching a comprehensive understanding of the social concerns attending any of the fields 
listed, enormous and sustained study is necessary.  
183 See Richard Posner, Smooth Sailing: Democracy Doesn’t Need Deliberation Day.  If Spending a Day Talking 
About Issues Were a Worthwhile Activity, You Wouldn’t Have to Pay Voters to Do It, 2004-FEB LEGAL AFF. 41, 42 
(2004): “I am unclear about what collective deliberation would add to our political system, but I am pretty clear 
about what it would subtract.  It would subtract from the time people have for their other pursuits – personal, 
familial, and commercial.”
59
of medicine) is entirely inconsistent with “career imperatives and the tugs of self-interest.”184
These are the modern realities of constant time pressures, limited attention spans, economic 
necessities, and a (perhaps justifiable) lack of interest in matters abstruse and dull.  The same can 
be said of other institutions.  Is the solution to the public’s lack of faith in its elected 
representatives more civics lessons, political theory classes, or disquisitions on the internecine 
workings of government?  Not only are such solutions wholly unworkable, but they also ask far 
too much of a public that is often indifferent to these issues and fully occupied in its own 
pursuits.  It is rational choice – not lack of educational opportunity – that keeps the public 
relatively uninformed.185
“More speech” – that is, a continuation and/or increase in the quantity of judicial 
criticism – say others.186   In a similar vein, some call for the wholesale relaxation of restraints on 
judicial speech, thereby permitting and encouraging judges to participate freely in the explosion 
184 POSNER, supra note 181, at 140.
185 See Somin, supra note 156: “So long as becoming an informed voter is the only reason for acquiring political 
knowledge most ordinary citizens will remain rationally ignorant.”  See also POSNER, supra note 181, at 152: “With 
so little at stake for the individual voter, who cannot expect actually to swing the election by his vote . . . he is prey 
to all those cognitive quirks that psychologists are busy documenting in their experimental subjects.  There is not 
enough at stake for him to make the effort required to resist taking the path of least resistance, the path of lazy 
thought.”  It is therefore rational choice, and the reality that most people simply don’t care to know (and will not 
benefit from knowing) the names and functions of the hundreds of, say, administrative agencies within the 
Executive branch, that perpetuates public ignorance.   
186 See Bogus, supra note 146, at 397.  Bogus is certainly in good company in this belief.  See, e.g., Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (using the marketplace of ideas metaphor that has become the cornerstone of freedom of 
speech doctrine); Bridges, 314 U.S. at 289 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, 
are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions . . . . [J]udges must be kept 
mindful of their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed 
with candor however blunt.”); Monroe H. Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence By Criticism of Judges –
A Proposed Solution to the Real Problem, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729 (1997): “The problem is not that too many 
lawyers are publicly criticizing judges.  Unfortunately, too few lawyers are willing to do so . . . .”; Howard M. 
Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 385 (2004): “Free speech demands that the 
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of critical dialogue (polylogue is more accurate).187  There is undeniable intrinsic value in 
discussion and the exchange of views in arriving at practical solutions to local problems of 
limited scope.188  In this case, however, more criticism, whether from the mouths of judges, 
lawyers, the media, or the general public, is no salve.  It is a “highly exaggerated faith” that 
believes that speech, in whatever form and to whatever degree, is either harmless or always to 
the good.189  Just the reverse is true.  The enormous increase in speech (through, for example, the 
medium of Internet web sites and chat rooms) has only served to balkanize and polarize 
positions, as individuals can access with facility viewpoints that move them toward “extreme 
points in line with their initial tendencies.”190  More criticism will beget more hostility toward 
and from the judiciary (as judges become more eager and able to speak publicly and 
uninhibitedly), as well as less respect for the institution – that, plainly, is the lesson to be drawn 
from our present state.191  Already the irritant of overabundant criticism has only exacerbated the 
greatest amount of information, thoughts, ideas, and opinions be disseminated from the greatest number of sources . 
. . . Speech is valuable because it informs people and persuades them . . . .”
187 See, e.g., Hon. Stephen J. Fortunato, On a Judge’s Duty to Speak Extrajudicially: Rethinking the Strategy of 
Silence, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 679, 681 (1999) (arguing that judges should respond aggressively and publicly to 
“baseless attacks on their integrity”); Hon. Joseph W. Bellacosa, Judging Cases v. Courting Public Opinion, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2381, 2382, 2385 (1997) (observing that “[c]ommentators’ views enjoy the luxurious freedom to 
be casually, even carelessly quick, while those of jurists must be studiously deliberative,” and therefore concluding 
that “[o]n balance, the stakes are too high and the turf too valuable for judges to sit by silently and complacently 
cede the discussion to a few populists with challengeable methodologies or debatable agendas”). 
188 See POSNER, supra note 181, at 137.
189 See White, supra note 154, at 813.
190
 L.A. Powe, Jr., Disease and Cure? Republic.Com by Cass Sunstein, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1947, 1952 (2003) (book 
review).  Professor Powe continues: “Sunstein’s remedy is wonderfully Brandeisian: more speech, speech rebutting 
speech.  But the concept of group polarization is premised on the fact that counterspeech is not accessed or else 
doesn’t get through.  The Internet may make acquisition of alternative information easier, but this doesn’t guarantee 
that the information will be accessed even if there is an offered link on the page.”
191
 Canon 3B(9) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct contemplates, at least with respect to pending matters, the 
necessity of keeping judges out of the fray of just such intercourse: “A judge shall not, while a proceeding is 
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chafed relationships between governmental branches, as well as between the judiciary and the 
public; it has also produced greater opportunities for political manipulation by the legislature in 
the form of threats of removal.  Is it reasonable to believe that greater quantities of criticism 
would produce the opposite result?  Neither of these answers – greater education or more speech 
– presents a workable or likely solution to the problem of the intense friction between the 
legislative and judicial branches.
IV. Conclusion
I have no feasible prescription for the ailment I have described.  It is too late in the day –
some sixty years after Bridges, and with the First Amendment basking in the fullness of its 
strength as one of the holiest of constitutional holies192 – to argue that limiting or stifling 
pending or impending in any court, make any public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its 
outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or 
hearing.”  Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(9).  One of the reasons for prohibiting judicial speech lies in 
the corrosive effect of such speech to the judiciary’s perceived legitimacy.
192 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREE SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 7 (1986) 
(observing that the concept of free speech is one of our “foremost cultural symbols”); White, supra note 154, at 811.  
Professor White offers the following convincing account of the common, horrified reaction to any proposal remotely 
suggesting that some speech may not be worthwhile:
Let me begin by asking you to reflect on you own response to what I have just said about certain strains of 
speech in our culture of which I disapprove . . . . If you are like me, a side of you will have reacted very 
strongly, something like this: “Who are you to use the word junk of any speech.  As Americans we are 
committed to our liberties, to our liberty of speech above all.  The explosion of speech in our public spaces 
is an inherently good thing, not a bad one, even if you don’t like it.  What kind of elitist are you anyway?”
Some such response . . . is I think deeply built into our minds and our culture.  It is an instinctive reaction 
so well established among us as to be a kind of second nature.  At the faintest signs of what looks like 
censorship or even disapproval of any form of speech we are likely to find ourselves resisting strongly.  We 
boldly say that we are willing to pay the price of too much speech – and of trivial or even dangerous speech 
– and for several very good reasons: in order to avoid the evil of government censorship; in order to make 
truly democratic politics possible; and in order to respect the right of the individual to form her mind, and 
her relations with others, in such manner as seems to her best . . . .This is a key part of what it means to be 
an American . . . . This is the position we instinctively resort to when someone challenges the idea that 
speech should be free.
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criticism of the judiciary is the answer.193  We arrive, then, at an impasse.  More judicial 
criticism (that is, the status quo) will not improve judicial/legislative relations; an imposed 
system of prior restraints against judicial criticism would be both politically intolerable in the 
present climate and would do little to shore up the perceived legitimacy of the courts; and any 
meaningful public education is impracticable and possibly undesirable.  The conclusion must be 
that further deterioration of the relationship between the legislative and judicial branches is 
inevitable – sacrificed at the altar of the First Amendment and the public worship of limitless 
critical exchange.  Congressional threats of removal against federal judges, merely the 
legislator’s opportunistic exploitation of the culture of criticism, will play an increasingly 
prominent role in that breakdown.  
193
 Justice Brandeis’ admonition that “enforced silence” is not a viable option except in the most dire of 
circumstances has reached legendary stature.  See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 377.
